目录

封面

总序

译者序

Part I

Part II

Part III

Part IV

Part V

Part VI

第一部分

第二部分

第三部分

第四部分

第五部分

第六部分

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封面

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总序

外研社自创立之日起就一贯秉承“记载人类文明，沟通世界文化”的宗旨。上世纪90年代以来，我们陆续出版了“九十年代英语系列丛书”、“大师经典文库”、“英美文学文库”等系列经典图书，在最大限度满足国内英语学习者阅读需求的同时，也为中华民族引进和吸收海外优秀文化发挥了重要的桥梁纽带作用。

在多年出版实践中我们发现，对原版图书简单地以外语形式呈现，会使一些初级和中级外语学习者望而却步；而纯粹的译著，在翻译过程中又容易失掉原著中的某些精妙之笔，甚至丢失信息，因为每种语言都蕴含着其他语言无法精确对应的情致、智慧和对真善美的洞见。文化交流本身是一个双向互动的过程，因此在大量引入外文作品的同时，我们也不能忽略本民族文化在世界范围内的推广和传播，即把中国文化传递给世界。

基于上述考虑，我们应时推出“外研社双语读库”，立足经典，涵盖中外名家名作，涉及社会科学各个领域，以书系划分，采用双语编排，对文化背景附有注释。旨在积累世界各民族精粹文化的同时，向世界传递中国文化，为国内广大英语学习者提供题材广泛、质量过硬的双语经典读物，也为社科各领域学者了解西方学术经典提供优质的研究素材。

2010年1月，双语读库“文·书系”出版问世，该书系收录了20部西方经典著作，多出自19和20世纪著名作家、学者、思想家和哲学家笔下，作品的题材丰富，包括传记、小说、游记、杂文、回忆录等。该书系自问世以来，受到了广大英语爱好者的欢迎和好评。

2010年3月，外研社和中国外语教育研究中心联合设立“外汉翻译教学研究基金”项目，选取百余部国外经典学术著作，面向全国高校公开招募翻译项目组，参与投标者遍及全国近百所高校，在国内具有较大影响力。中标的译者多为全国重点高校的翻译专家、学者及中青年翻译人才，经过层层选拔脱颖而出；每个中标项目组还聘请相关领域的专家顾问，为其提供专业领域方面的支持和帮助，以确保译文的准确性和权威性。

此次推出的双语读库“学·书系”拟收录该“基金”项目中的优秀译作分批次进行出版，并细分为哲学辑、经济学辑、历史学辑、地理学辑、语言学辑、社会学辑、教育学辑等。“学·书系”依旧采用英汉对照编排，可作为社科各领域的学术研究读物以及中、高端英汉双语读物使用。

“学·书系”所选原作虽为经典名著，却也无法避免时间和空间上的局限性，希望读者朋友们能“取其精华，去其糟粕”。各篇译作均为译者倾尽全力、呕心沥血之作，不足之处，还请各位读者批评、指正。

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译者序

翻译缘起

本书是中国外语教育研究中心和外语教学与研究出版社网上在线公布的招标项目“外汉翻译教学研究基金”的研究成果之一。

这个项目的获得令我们感到既偶然又欣喜。得到消息后，我们项目组的全体人员几天都欣欣然，非常愉悦，因为这是我们全体人员第一次有缘与中国外语界最权威出版社亲密接触。

与外研社的第一次亲密接触使我们受益良多。首先，我们能够以一种轻松平常的心态与权威出版社合作，完成一件有意义的事情。其次，中国外语教育研究中心的专家们对试译稿的修改也给予了我们很多教益和启示，使我们深刻地认识到：做翻译必须有严谨的态度，汉语的习得和使用是永无止境的，必须时时察习。同时，这些修改意见也给我们完成后面的翻译提供了指针，规范了具体的操作方法，犹如深夜在茫茫大海上行船，突然看到了灯塔，便有了航行的目标，知道如何采取行动。

翻译的预期目标

翻译之初，我们讨论制订了翻译目标。翻译的目标读者设定为高端读者为主，兼顾其他读者。这里的高端读者主要是指两类人群：学习、研究哲学的读者和学习、研究英汉翻译的读者。这样可以帮助前者从另一版本（法语译成的英语版本）研读哲学名著，也可以帮助后者从哲学文体的视角研习英汉翻译之奥妙。当然，我们欢迎更多的读者阅读，各取所需。

拟定目标读者群有助于我们把握译文文体，用适当的方法来遣词造句，润饰文字。因此，译文的翻译标准拟尽量追求忠实、通顺；文体方面，尽量保持原文风貌，即哲学严谨的思辨逻辑，文风的简洁和流畅；文字方面，尽量做到通俗词语中带些文言表述，句式长短相间，繁复简约搭配。

中国传统哲学著作的风格就是简约，辞简而意丰。因此，中国人（尤其是人文社科领域的学者们）的阅读习惯和思维能力应该具有这样的风格趋向。所以，本译文尽量追求这样的风格，更通俗地说，就是准确、不生涩的风格。希望这样的风格能够契合潜在读者的阅读习惯和思维能力。

另一方面，对许多读者而言，现在的许多哲学译本都是枯燥而且玄奥的。原因在于他们感到哲学译本文字较枯涩，句式冗长复杂，所表达的意思晦涩难懂，不能体现出现代汉语的简约美和流畅美。本译文试图挖掘现代汉语的简约美，用简约、流畅的现代汉语来表达西方哲学名著的魅力。

翻译难点的突破

翻译的难点是准确理解原文，并通顺地用译语表达出来。因为原文是哲学名著，本身具有哲学思辨的抽象性，所以理解起来有一定的难度，另外，原文的遣词造句与普通英语不同，词义较难准确把握，句子、段落的意群转接需要仔细推敲才能确定，这也增加了理解的难度。表达方面的难度是如何寻找并确定最合适的、最准确的现代汉语对应词及表达句式。

面对理解方面的困难，我们以“奇文共欣赏，疑异相与析”的方法来攻克。具体而言，就是遇到疑难句子，大家互相讨论，各抒己见，最后达成共识。

在表达方面，严复的观点给了我们很大的启示。他说：“窃以谓文辞者，载理想之羽翼，而以达情感之音声也。是故理之精者不能载以粗犷之词，而情之正者不可达以鄙倍之气。中国文之美者，莫若司马迁、韩愈。而迁之言曰：‘其志洁者，其称物芳。’愈之言曰：‘文无难易，惟其是。’仆之于文，非务渊雅也，务其是耳。”这指导我们以创作精品的态度来翻译，在尽量忠实原文的基础上，尽量做到每一句译文都字斟句酌。

具体而言，单字成词、词组搭配不仅考虑每个词音的长短、抑扬顿挫，还考虑该词组在句子中是否相称、和谐；句子方面，则力图做到句式长短相间，繁复简约搭配；同时，我们还考虑到了段落中句子的流畅衔接问题。

总而言之，译者之所以这样译，首先是求能将原文意义表达清楚，在此基础上，修饰文笔，以求文章通顺、富有意味。古人云：诗无达诂。对译文而言，更是难以达到至善至美。但是，翻译中的拣字炼句、联句成篇就是一种苦心经营的快乐。如果我们苦心经营的拣字炼句、联句成篇能让读者快乐阅读，并从阅读中收获知识、品味快乐，则是我们最大的快乐。

《谈谈方法》内容简介

《谈谈方法》是笛卡尔的处女作，也是他的代表作之一，影响巨大。全书包括六部分：1）作者对各门学问的看法；2）作者寻求方法的几条原则；3）从方法中引导出的几项行为准则；4）作者用来证明神的存在、人的灵魂存在的理由；5）作者研究过的一系列物理问题；6）作者认为一定要做哪些事情才能使自然研究更进一步，以及促使其撰写此书的理由。

这本薄薄的书之所以举世闻名、历久弥新，乃是因为这本书真正指出了研究问题的具体方法，也就是给出了四个具体的步骤：

1）对自己不清楚的问题要持怀疑态度，尽量避免盲从、鲁莽和偏见，要根据自己非常清楚和确定的知识来判断别人的观点；

2）将复杂的问题尽量分解为多个简单的小问题，然后一个一个地分开来解决；

3）将这些小问题从简单到复杂排列，先解决容易的问题，然后再循序渐进，依次解决较难的问题；

4）将所有问题解决后，再综合起来检验，看是否完全，是否将问题彻底解决了。

笛卡尔的《谈谈方法》对人类科学发展具有划时代的意义，被公认为近代哲学的宣言书，树起了理性主义认识论的大旗。自其诞生起，西方科学研究的方法，从机械到人体解剖的研究，基本都是按照笛卡尔的《谈谈方法》进行的，对西方近代科学的飞速发展起了相当大的促进作用。

有人甚至说，直到20世纪60年代，人们才发现《谈谈方法》有一定的缺陷，如人体功能只是各部位机械的综合，而对其互相之间的作用则研究不透。直到阿波罗1号登月工程的出现，科学家才发现，有的复杂问题无法分解，必须以复杂的方法来对待，因此导致系统工程的出现，笛卡尔的方法才第一次被综合性的方法所取代。但是，不可否认的是，任何综合性的方法都是和笛卡尔首倡的分析方法相辅相成的。

结束语

本项目是由西安外国语大学一群志同道合的成员群策群力、精诚合作完成的。原著英文仅有23,130词，所以项目组成员一鼓作气，两个月完成翻译。具体分工如下：石春让、王江超两人共同翻译，互相校对，并整理出术语表和专用名词表。师媛、吴耀武、牛小龙通读译文，勘校谬误，并审核术语表和专用名词表。最后，石春让、迟延萍、魏在江通读译文、术语表和专用名词表，审校并定稿。

另外，本译本还得到中国外语教育研究中心和外语教学与研究出版社各位专家和编辑的大力帮助，他们认真、严格、严谨的审校工作和编辑工作使译本大为增色。在此谨向他们表示深深的敬意和感谢。另外，本译本的诞生还要感谢西安外国语大学学报编辑部、科研处等相关部门的大力支持，在此也向他们表示深深的敬意和感谢。

俗语云：十月怀胎，一朝分娩。看着即将付梓的稿件，正如看着刚刚呱呱落地的孩子。欣喜之情，溢于言表。同时，惶恐之情也相伴而生。因水平有限，虽倾尽全力仍不免有不足之处，在此敬请各位读者指正。

译者

2011年春

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Part I

Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that even those who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken; the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it.

For myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more perfect than those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often wished that I were equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in clearness and distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and readiness of memory. And besides these, I know of no other qualities that contribute to the perfection of the mind; for as to the reason or sense, inasmuch as it is that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in each individual; and on this point to adopt the common opinion of philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less holds only among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same species.

I will not hesitate, however, to avow my belief that it has been my singular good fortune to have very early in life fallen in with certain tracks which have conducted me to considerations and maxims, of which I have formed a method that gives me the means, as I think, of gradually augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by little and little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of my life will permit me to reach. For I have already reaped from it such fruits that, although I have been accustomed to think lowly enough of myself, and although when I look with the eye of a philosopher at the varied courses and pursuits of mankind at large, I find scarcely one which does not appear in vain and useless, I nevertheless derive the highest satisfaction from the progress I conceive myself to have already made in the search after truth, and cannot help entertaining such expectations of the future as to believe that if, among the occupations of men as men, there is any one really excellent and important, it is that which I have chosen.

After all, it is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and also how much the judgments of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favor. But I shall endeavor in this discourse to describe the paths I have followed, and to delineate my life as in a picture, in order that each one may also be able to judge of them for himself, and that in the general opinion entertained of them, as gathered from current report, I myself may have a new help towards instruction to be added to those I have been in the habit of employing.

My present design, then, is not to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his reason, but solely to describe the way in which I have endeavored to conduct my own. They who set themselves to give precepts must of course regard themselves as possessed of greater skill than those to whom they prescribe; and if they err in the slightest particular, they subject themselves to censure. But as this tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale, in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favor with all.

From my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and as I was given to believe that by their help a clear and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life might be acquired, I was ardently desirous of instruction. But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close of which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I completely changed my opinion. For I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance. And yet I was studying in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe, in which I thought there must be learned men, if such were anywhere to be found. I had been taught all that others learned there; and not contented with the sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read all the books that had fallen into my hands, treating of such branches as are esteemed the most curious and rare. I knew the judgment which others had formed of me; and I did not find that I was considered inferior to my fellows, although there were among them some who were already marked out to fill the places of our instructors. And, in fine, our age appeared to me as flourishing, and as fertile in powerful minds as any preceding one. I was thus led to take the liberty of judging of all other men by myself, and of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature as I had previously been given to believe.

I still continued, however, to hold in esteem the studies of the schools. I was aware that the languages taught in them are necessary to the understanding of the writings of the ancients; that the grace of fable stirs the mind; that the memorable deeds of history elevate it, and, if read with discretion, aid in forming the judgment; that the perusal of all excellent books is, as it were, to interview with the noblest men of past ages, who have written them, and even a studied interview, in which are discovered to us only their choicest thoughts; that eloquence has incomparable force and beauty; that poesy has its ravishing graces and delights; that in the mathematics there are many refined discoveries eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive, as well as further all the arts and lessen the labour of man; that numerous highly useful precepts and exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on morals; that theology points out the path to heaven; that philosophy affords the means of discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters, and commands the admiration of the more simple; that jurisprudence, medicine, and the other sciences, secure for their cultivators honors and riches; and, in fine, that it is useful to bestow some attention upon all, even upon those abounding the most in superstition and error, that we may be in a position to determine their real value, and guard against being deceived.

But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to languages, and likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to their histories and fables. For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel, are almost the same thing. It is useful to know something of the manners of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct judgment regarding our own, and be prevented from thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous and irrational, a conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has been limited to their own country. On the other hand, when too much time is occupied in traveling, we become strangers to our native country; and the over curious in the customs of the past are generally ignorant of those of the present. Besides, fictitious narratives lead us to imagine the possibility of many events that are impossible; and even the most faithful histories, if they do not wholly misrepresent matters, or exaggerate their importance to render the account of them more worthy of perusal, omit, at least, almost always the meanest and least striking of the attendant circumstances; hence it happens that the remainder does not represent the truth, and that such as regulate their conduct by examples drawn from this source, are apt to fall into the extravagances of the knight-errants of romance, and to entertain projects that exceed their powers.

I esteemed eloquence highly, and was in raptures with poesy; but I thought that both were gifts of nature rather than fruits of study. Those in whom the faculty of reason is predominant, and who most skillfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them clear and intelligible, are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of what they lay down, though they should speak only in the language of Lower Brittany, and be wholly ignorant of the rules of rhetoric; and those whose minds are stored with the most agreeable fancies, and who can give expression to them with the greatest embellishment and harmony, are still the best poets, though unacquainted with the art of poetry.

I was especially delighted with the mathematics, on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings; but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that they but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier superstructure reared on them. On the other hand, I compared the disquisitions of the ancient moralists to very towering and magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud: they laud the virtues very highly, and exhibit them as estimable far above anything on earth; but they give us no adequate criterion of virtue, and frequently that which they designate with so fine a name is but apathy, or pride, or despair, or parricide.

I revered our theology, and aspired as much as any one to reach heaven: but being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which lead to heaven are above our comprehension, I did not presume to subject them to the impotency of my reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of being more than man.

Of philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success would be greater in it than that of others; and further, when I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable.

As to the other sciences, inasmuch as these borrow their principles from philosophy, I judged that no solid superstructures could be reared on foundations so infirm; and neither the honor nor the gain held out by them was sufficient to determine me to their cultivation: for I was not, thank Heaven, in a condition which compelled me to make merchandise of science for the bettering of my fortune; and though I might not profess to scorn glory as a cynic, I yet made very slight account of that honor which I hoped to acquire only through fictitious titles. And, in fine, of false sciences I thought I knew the worth sufficiently to escape being deceived by the professions of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, or by the artifices and boasting of any of those who profess to know things of which they are ignorant.

For these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the control of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder of my youth in traveling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my experience as to secure my improvement. For it occurred to me that I should find much more truth in the reasonings of each individual with reference to the affairs in which he is personally interested, and the issue of which must presently punish him if he has judged amiss, than in those conducted by a man of letters in his study, regarding speculative matters that are of no practical moment, and followed by no consequences to himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster his vanity the better the more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as they must in this case, the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable. In addition, I had always a most earnest desire to know how to distinguish the true from the false, in order that I might be able clearly to discriminate the right path in life, and proceed in it with confidence.

It is true that, while busied only in considering the manners of other men, I found here, too, scarce any ground for settled conviction, and remarked hardly less contradiction among them than in the opinions of the philosophers. So that the greatest advantage I derived from the study consisted in this, that, observing many things which, however extravagant and ridiculous to our apprehension, are yet by common consent received and approved by other great nations, I learned to entertain too decided a belief in regard to nothing of the truth of which I had been persuaded merely by example and custom; and thus I gradually extricated myself from many errors powerful enough to darken our natural intelligence, and incapacitate us in great measure from listening to reason. But after I had been occupied several years in thus studying the book of the world, and in essaying to gather some experience, I at length resolved to make myself an object of study, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I ought to follow, an undertaking which was accompanied with greater success than it would have been had I never quitted my country or my books.

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Part II

I was then in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country, which have not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the army from the coronation of the emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a locality where, as I found no society to interest me, and was besides fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. Of these one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different hands had been employed, as in those completed by a single master. Thus it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed, are generally more elegant and commodious than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built. Thus also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only villages, have become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill laid out compared with the regularity constructed towns which a professional architect has freely planned on an open plain; so that although the several buildings of the former may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter, yet when one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a large one and here a small, and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets, one is disposed to allege that chance rather than any human will guided by reason must have led to such an arrangement. And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all times certain officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings contributed to public ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with but the materials of others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged. In the same way I fancied that those nations which, starting from a semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilization by slow degrees, have had their laws successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply by experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those which, from the commencement of their association as communities, have followed the appointments of some wise legislator. It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the true religion, the ordinances of which are derived from God, must be incomparably superior to that of every other. And, to speak of human affairs, I believe that the pre-eminence of Sparta was due not to the goodness of each of its laws in particular, for many of these were very strange, and even opposed to good morals, but to the circumstance that, originated by a single individual, they all tended to a single end. In the same way I thought that the sciences contained in books (such of them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstrations), composed as they are of the opinions of many different individuals massed together, are farther removed from truth than the simple inferences which a man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting the matters of his experience. And because we have all to pass through a state of infancy to manhood, and have been of necessity, for a length of time, governed by our desires and preceptors (whose dictates were frequently conflicting, while neither perhaps always counseled us for the best), I farther concluded that it is almost impossible that our judgments can be so correct or solid as they would have been, had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and had we always been guided by it alone.

It is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses of a town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private individual takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and that people are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in danger of falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure. With this before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would indeed be preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state by fundamentally changing it throughout, and overturning it in order to set it up amended; and the same I thought was true of any similar project for reforming the body of the sciences, or the order of teaching them established in the schools: but as for the opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of reason. I firmly believed that in this way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leaned upon principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust. For although I recognized various difficulties in this undertaking, these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as attend the slightest reformation in public affairs. Large bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept erect when once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is always disastrous. Then if there are any imperfections in the constitutions of states (and that many such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure us), custom has without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniences, and has even managed to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a number which sagacity could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in fine, the defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being much frequented, become gradually so smooth and commodious, that it is much better to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops of rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.

Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and busy meddlers who, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always projecting reforms; and if I thought that this tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I was a victim of such folly, I would by no means permit its publication. I have never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly my own. And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt. Those whom God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate. The single design to strip one's self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken by every one. The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this be at all a befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who with more than a due confidence in their own powers, are precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if men of this class once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they will never be able to thread the byway that would lead them by a shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for life; in the second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed, ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to their own reason.

For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest learning. But I had become aware, even so early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some one of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours are not in that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that many of these nations make an equally good, if not better, use of their reason than we do. I took into account also the very different character which a person brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this individual would have possessed had he lived always with savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favor before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and example than any certain knowledge. And, finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be found by one than by many. I could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my own reason in the conduct of my life.

But like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I would at least guard against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without having been introduced by reason, but first of all took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.

Among the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some attention to logic, and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis and algebra—three arts or sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute something to my design. But, on examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail—rather in the communication of what we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown; and although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble. Then as to the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination; and, in the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas, that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind. By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects. And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state is best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.

The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.

The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.

The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.

And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.

The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another. And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have hitherto sought truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations. I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound. But I had no intention on that account of attempting to master all the particular sciences commonly denominated mathematics: but observing that, however different their objects, they all agree in considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting among those objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these proportions in the most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular, except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of them, and without by any means restricting them to these, that afterwards I might thus be the better able to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately applicable. Perceiving further, that in order to understand these relations I should sometimes have to consider them one by one and sometimes only to bear them in mind, or embrace them in the aggregate, I thought that, in order the better to consider them individually, I should view them as subsisting between straight lines, than which I could find no objects more simple, or capable of being more distinctly represented to my imagination and senses; and on the other hand, that in order to retain them in the memory or embrace an aggregate of many, I should express them by certain characters the briefest possible. In this way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in geometrical analysis and in algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by help of the other.

And, in point of fact, the accurate observance of these few precepts gave me, I take the liberty of saying, such ease in unraveling all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three months I devoted to their examination, not only did I reach solutions of questions I had formerly deemed exceedingly difficult but even as regards questions of the solution of which I continued ignorant, I was enabled, as it appeared to me, to determine the means whereby, and the extent to which a solution was possible; results attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most general truths, and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones. Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain, if it be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one whoever apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known. The child, for example, who has been instructed in the elements of arithmetic, and has made a particular addition, according to rule, may be assured that he has found, with respect to the sum of the numbers before him, and that in this instance is within the reach of human genius. Now, in conclusion, the method which teaches adherence to the true order, and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing.sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic.

But the chief ground of my satisfaction with thus method, was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not with absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides, I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped also, from not having restricted this method to any particular matter, to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences, with not less success than to those of algebra. I should not, however, on this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been contrary to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the knowledge of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in which I found nothing certain, I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish its principles. And because I observed, besides, that an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the greatest moment, and one in which precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were most to be dreaded, I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age (being at that time but twenty-three), and had first of all employed much of my time in preparation for the work, as well by eradicating from my mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted, as by amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings, and by continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to increased skill in its application.

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Part III

And finally, as it is not enough, before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live, that it be pulled down, and materials and builders provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves, according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain irresolute in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement, and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living. For as I had from that time begun to hold my own opinions for nought because I wished to subject them all to examination, I was convinced that I could not do better than follow in the meantime the opinions of the most judicious; and although there are some perhaps among the Persians as judicious as among ourselves, expediency seemed to dictate that I should regulate my practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should have to live; and it appeared to me that, in order to ascertain the real opinions of such, I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practised than of what they said, not only because, in the corruption of our manners, there are few disposed to speak exactly as they believe, but also because very many are not aware of what it is that they really believe; for, as the act of mind by which a thing is believed is different from that by which we know that we believe it, the one act is often found without the other. Also, amid many opinions held in equal repute, I chose always the most moderate, as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient for practice, and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious), as that, in the event of my falling into error, I might be at less distance from the truth than if, having chosen one of the extremes, it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted. And I placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat of our freedom is abridged; not that I disapproved of the laws which, to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution, when what is sought to be accomplished is some good, permit engagements by vows and contracts binding the parties to persevere in it, or even, for the security of commerce, sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change, and because, for myself in particular, I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments, and not to suffer them to deteriorate, I would have deemed it a grave sin against good sense, if, for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time, I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time, when perhaps it had ceased to be so, or I had ceased to esteem it such.

My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection; for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest. In the same way, since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it is very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain, since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities. This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice, allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best, which they abandon the next, as the opposite.

My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts, there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in things external to us, all wherein we fail of success is to be held, as regards us, absolutely impossible: and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding represents as in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we consider all external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived of them without any fault of ours, than our not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity, we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment, than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to fly with. But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in this light; and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid suffering and poverty, enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied. For, occupied incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed to their power by nature, they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at their disposal except their own thoughts, that this conviction was of itself sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects; and over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more powerful, more free and more happy, than other men who, whatever be the favors heaped on them by nature and fortune, if destitute of this philosophy, can never command the realization of all their desires.

In fine, to conclude this code of morals, I thought of reviewing the different occupations of men in this life, with the view of making choice of the best. And, without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments of others, I may state that it was my conviction that I could not do better than continue in that in which I was engaged, viz., in devoting my whole life to the culture of my reason, and in making the greatest progress I was able in the knowledge of truth, on the principles of the method which I had prescribed to myself. This method, from the time I had begun to apply it, had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as to lead me to believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily discovered truths that appeared to me of some importance, and of which other men were generally ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind that I was wholly indifferent to every other object. Besides, the three preceding maxims were founded singly on the design of continuing the work of self-instruction. For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task. Nor could I have proceeded on such opinions without scruple, had I supposed that I should thereby forfeit any advantage for attaining still more accurate, should such exist. And, in fine, I could not have restrained my desires, nor remained satisfied had I not followed a path in which I thought myself certain of attaining all the knowledge to the acquisition of which I was competent, as well as the largest amount of what is truly good which I could ever hope to secure. Inasmuch as we neither seek nor shun any object except in so far as our understanding represents it as good or bad, all that is necessary to right action is right judgment, and to the best action the most correct judgment, that is, to the acquisition of all the virtues with all else that is truly valuable and within our reach; and the assurance of such an acquisition cannot fail to render us contented.

Having thus provided myself with these maxims, and having placed them in reserve along with the truths of faith, which have ever occupied the first place in my belief, I came to the conclusion that I might with freedom set about ridding myself of what remained of my opinions. And, inasmuch as I hoped to be better able successfully to accomplish this work by holding intercourse with mankind, than by remaining longer shut up in the retirement where these thoughts had occurred to me, I betook me again to traveling before the winter was well ended. And, during the nine subsequent years, I did nothing but roam from one place to another, desirous of being a spectator rather than an actor in the plays exhibited on the theater of the world; and, as I made it my business in each matter to reflect particularly upon what might fairly be doubted and prove a source of error, I gradually rooted out from my mind all the errors which had hitherto crept into it. Not that in this I imitated the sceptics who doubt only that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself; for, on the contrary, my design was singly to find ground of assurance, and cast aside the loose earth and sand, that I might reach the rock or the clay. In this, as appears to me, I was successful enough; for, since I endeavored to discover the falsehood or incertitude of the propositions I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I met with nothing so doubtful as not to yield some conclusion of adequate certainty, although this were merely the inference, that the matter in question contained nothing certain. And, just as in pulling down an old house, we usually reserve the ruins to contribute towards the erection, so, in destroying such of my opinions as I judged to be ill-founded, I made a variety of observations and acquired an amount of experience of which I availed myself in the establishment of more certain. And further, I continued to exercise myself in the method I had prescribed; for, besides taking care in general to conduct all my thoughts according to its rules, I reserved some hours from time to time which I expressly devoted to the employment of the method in the solution of mathematical difficulties, or even in the solution likewise of some questions belonging to other sciences, but which, by my having detached them from such principles of these sciences as were of inadequate certainty, were rendered almost mathematical: the truth of this will be manifest from the numerous examples contained in this volume. And thus, without in appearance living otherwise than those who, with no other occupation than that of spending their lives agreeably and innocently, study to sever pleasure from vice, and who, that they may enjoy their leisure without ennui, have recourse to such pursuits as are honorable, I was nevertheless prosecuting my design, and making greater progress in the knowledge of truth, than I might, perhaps, have made had I been engaged in the perusal of books merely, or in holding converse with men of letters.

These nine years passed away, however, before I had come to any determinate judgment respecting the difficulties which form matter of dispute among the learned, or had commenced to seek the principles of any philosophy more certain than the vulgar. And the examples of many men of the highest genius, who had, in former times, engaged in this inquiry, but, as appeared to me, without success, led me to imagine it to be a work of so much difficulty, that I would not perhaps have ventured on it so soon had I not heard it currently rumored that I had already completed the inquiry. I know not what were the grounds of this opinion; and, if my conversation contributed in any measure to its rise, this must have happened rather from my having confessed my ignorance with greater freedom than those are accustomed to do who have studied a little, and expounded perhaps, the reasons that led me to doubt of many of those things that by others are esteemed certain, than from my having boasted of any system of philosophy. But, as I am of a disposition that makes me unwilling to be esteemed different from what I really am, I thought it necessary to endeavor by all means to render myself worthy of the reputation accorded to me; and it is now exactly eight years since this desire constrained me to remove from all those places where interruption from any of my acquaintances was possible, and betake myself to this country, in which the long duration of the war has led to the establishment of such discipline, that the armies maintained seem to be of use only in enabling the inhabitants to enjoy more securely the blessings of peace and where, in the midst of a great crowd actively engaged in business, and more careful of their own affairs than curious about those of others, I have been enabled to live without being deprived of any of the conveniences to be had in the most populous cities, and yet as solitary and as retired as in the midst of the most remote deserts.

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Part IV

I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.

In the next place, I attentively examined what I was and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that " I," that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.

After this I inquired in general into what is essential I to the truth and certainty of a proposition; for since I had discovered one which I knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise be able to discover the ground of this certitude. And as I observed that in the words I think, therefore I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.

In the next place, from reflecting on the circumstance that I doubted, and that consequently my being was not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I was led to inquire whence I had learned to think of something more perfect than myself; and I clearly recognized that I must hold this notion from some nature which in reality was more perfect. As for the thoughts of many other objects external to me, as of the sky, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand more, I was less at a loss to know whence these came; for since I remarked in them nothing which seemed to render them superior to myself, I could believe that, if these were true, they were dependencies on my own nature, in so far as it possessed a certain perfection, and, if they were false, that I held them from nothing, that is to say, that they were in me because of a certain imperfection of my nature. But this could not be the case with the idea of a nature more perfect than myself; for to receive it from nothing was a thing manifestly impossible; and, because it is not less repugnant that the more perfect should be an effect of, and dependence on the less perfect, than that something should proceed from nothing, it was equally impossible that I could hold it from myself: accordingly, it but remained that it had been placed in me by a nature which was in reality more perfect than mine, and which even possessed within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea; that is to say, in a single word, which was God. And to this I added that, since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being in existence (I will here, with your permission, freely use the terms of the schools); but, on the contrary, that there was of necessity some other more perfect Being upon whom I was dependent, and from whom I had received all that I possessed; for if I had existed alone, and independently of every other being, so as to have had from myself all the perfection, however little, which I actually possessed, I should have been able, for the same reason, to have had from myself the whole remainder of perfection, of the want of which I was conscious, and thus could of myself have become infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and, in fine, have possessed all the perfections which I could recognize in God. For in order to know the nature of God (whose existence has been established by the preceding reasonings), as far as my own nature permitted, I had only to consider in reference to all the properties of which I found in my mind some idea, whether their possession was a mark of perfection; and I was assured that no one which indicated any imperfection was in him, and that none of the rest was awanting. Thus I perceived that doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and such like, could not be found in God, since I myself would have been happy to be free from them. Besides, I had ideas of many sensible and corporeal things; for although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all which I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were in reality in my thoughts. But, because I had already very clearly recognized in myself that the intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, and as I observed that all composition is an evidence of dependency, and that a state of dependency is manifestly a state of imperfection, I therefore determined that it could not be a perfection in God to be compounded of these two natures and that consequently he was not so compounded; but that if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences, or other natures that were not wholly perfect, their existence depended on his power in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single moment.

I was disposed straightway to search for other truths and when I had represented to myself the object of the geometers, which I conceived to be a continuous body or a space indefinitely extended in length, breadth, and height or depth, divisible into divers parts which admit of different figures and sizes, and of being moved or transposed in all manner of ways (for all this the geometers suppose to be in the object they contemplate), I went over some of their simplest demonstrations. And, in the first place, I observed, that the great certitude which by common consent is accorded to these demonstrations, is founded solely upon this, that they are clearly conceived in accordance with the rules I have already laid down. In the next place, I perceived that there was nothing at all in these demonstrations which could assure me of the existence of their object: thus, for example, supposing a triangle to be given, I distinctly perceived that its three angles were necessarily equal to two right angles, but I did not on that account perceive anything which could assure me that any triangle existed: while, on the contrary, recurring to the examination of the idea of a Perfect Being, I found that the existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle, or as in the idea of a sphere, the equidistance of all points on its surface from the center, or even still more clearly; and that consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as any demonstration of geometry can be.

But the reason which leads many to persuade them selves that there is a difficulty in knowing this truth, and even also in knowing what their mind really is, is that they never raise their thoughts above sensible objects, and are so accustomed to consider nothing except by way of imagination, which is a mode of thinking limited to material objects, that all that is not imaginable seems to them not intelligible. The truth of this is sufficiently manifest from the single circumstance, that the philosophers of the schools accept as a maxim that there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the senses, in which however it is certain that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been; and it appears to me that they who make use of their imagination to comprehend these ideas do exactly the same thing as if, in order to hear sounds or smell odors, they strove to avail themselves of their eyes; unless indeed that there is this difference, that the sense of sight does not afford us an inferior assurance to those of smell or hearing; in place of which, neither our imagination nor our senses can give us assurance of anything unless our understanding intervene.

Finally, if there be still persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul, by the reasons I have adduced, I am desirous that they should know that all the other propositions, of the truth of which they deem themselves perhaps more assured, as that we have a body, and that there exist stars and an earth, and such like, are less certain; for, although we have a moral assurance of these things, which is so strong that there is an appearance of extravagance in doubting of their existence, yet at the same time no one, unless his intellect is impaired, can deny, when the question relates to a metaphysical certitude, that there is sufficient reason to exclude entire assurance, in the observation that when asleep we can in the same way imagine ourselves possessed of another body and that we see other stars and another earth, when there is nothing of the kind. For how do we know that the thoughts which occur in dreaming are false rather than those other which we experience when awake, since the former are often not less vivid and distinct than the latter? And though men of the highest genius study this question as long as they please, I do not believe that they will be able to give any reason which can be sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For, in the first place even the principle which I have already taken as a rule, viz., that all the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true, is certain only because God is or exists and because he is a Perfect Being, and because all that we possess is derived from him: whence it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their clearness and distinctness are real, and proceed from God, must to that extent be true. Accordingly, whereas we not infrequently have ideas or notions in which some falsity is contained, this can only be the case with such as are to some extent confused and obscure, and in this proceed from nothing (participate of negation), that is, exist in us thus confused because we are not wholly perfect. And it is evident that it is not less repugnant that falsity or imperfection, in so far as it is imperfection, should proceed from God, than that truth or perfection should proceed from nothing. But if we did not know that all which we possess of real and true proceeds from a Perfect and Infinite Being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no ground on that account for the assurance that they possessed the perfection of being true.

But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily understand that the truth of the thoughts we experience when awake, ought not in the slightest degree to be called in question on account of the illusions of our dreams. For if it happened that an individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as, for example, if a geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstance of his being asleep would not militate against its truth; and as for the most ordinary error of our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as our external senses, this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very properly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; for we are not infrequently deceived in the same manner when awake; as when persons in the jaundice see all objects yellow, or when the stars or bodies at a great distance appear to us much smaller than they are. For, in fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our reason. And it must be noted that I say of our reason, and not of our imagination or of our senses: thus, for example, although we very clearly see the sun, we ought not therefore to determine that it is only of the size which our sense of sight presents; and we may very distinctly imagine the head of a lion joined to the body of a goat, without being therefore shut up to the conclusion that a chimaera exists; for it is not a dictate of reason that what we thus see or imagine is in reality existent; but it plainly tells us that all our ideas or notions contain in them some truth; for otherwise it could not be that God, who is wholly perfect and veracious, should have placed them in us. And because our reasonings are never so clear or so complete during sleep as when we are awake, although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as lively and distinct, if not more so than in our waking moments, reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.

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Part V

I would here willingly have proceeded to exhibit the whole chain of truths which I deduced from these primary but as with a view to this it would have been necessary now to treat of many questions in dispute among the learned, with whom I do not wish to be embroiled, I believe that it will be better for me to refrain from this exposition, and only mention in general what these truths are, that the more judicious may be able to determine whether a more special account of them would conduce to the public advantage. I have ever remained firm in my original resolution to suppose no other principle than that of which I have recently availed myself in demonstrating the existence of God and of the soul, and to accept as true nothing that did not appear to me more clear and certain than the demonstrations of the geometers had formerly appeared; and yet I venture to state that not only have I found means to satisfy myself in a short time on all the principal difficulties which are usually treated of in philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws established in nature by God in such a manner, and of which he has impressed on our minds such notions, that after we have reflected sufficiently upon these, we cannot doubt that they are accurately observed in all that exists or takes place in the world and farther, by considering the concatenation of these laws, it appears to me that I have discovered many truths more useful and more important than all I had before learned, or even had expected to learn.

But because I have essayed to expound the chief of these discoveries in a treatise which certain considerations prevent me from publishing, I cannot make the results known more conveniently than by here giving a summary of the contents of this treatise. It was my design to comprise in it all that, before I set myself to write it, I thought I knew of the nature of material objects. But like the painters who, finding themselves unable to represent equally well on a plain surface all the different faces of a solid body, select one of the chief, on which alone they make the light fall, and throwing the rest into the shade, allow them to appear only in so far as they can be seen while looking at the principal one; so, fearing lest I should not be able to compense in my discourse all that was in my mind, I resolved to expound singly, though at considerable length, my opinions regarding light; then to take the opportunity of adding something on the sun and the fixed stars, since light almost wholly proceeds from them; on the heavens since they transmit it; on the planets, comets, and earth, since they reflect it; and particularly on all the bodies that are upon the earth, since they are either colored, or transparent, or luminous; and finally on man, since he is the spectator of these objects. Further, to enable me to cast this variety of subjects somewhat into the shade, and to express my judgment regarding them with greater freedom, without being necessitated to adopt or refute the opinions of the learned, I resolved to leave all the people here to their disputes, and to speak only of what would happen in a new world, if God were now to create somewhere in the imaginary spaces matter sufficient to compose one, and were to agitate variously and confusedly the different parts of this matter, so that there resulted a chaos as disordered as the poets ever feigned, and after that did nothing more than lend his ordinary concurrence to nature, and allow her to act in accordance with the laws which he had established. On this supposition, I, in the first place, described this matter, and essayed to represent it in such a manner that to my mind there can be nothing clearer and more intelligible, except what has been recently said regarding God and the soul; for I even expressly supposed that it possessed none of those forms or qualities which are so debated in the schools, nor in general anything the knowledge of which is not so natural to our minds that no one can so much as imagine himself ignorant of it. Besides, I have pointed out what are the laws of nature; and, with no other principle upon which to found my reasonings except the infinite perfection of God, I endeavored to demonstrate all those about which there could be any room for doubt, and to prove that they are such, that even if God had created more worlds, there could have been none in which these laws were not observed. Thereafter, I showed how the greatest part of the matter of this chaos must, in accordance with these laws, dispose and arrange itself in such a way as to present the appearance of heavens; how in the meantime some of its parts must compose an earth and some planets and comets, and others a sun and fixed stars. And, making a digression at this stage on the subject of light, I expounded at considerable length what the nature of that light must be which is found in the sun and the stars, and how thence in an instant of time it traverses the immense spaces of the heavens, and how from the planets and comets it is reflected towards the earth. To this I likewise added much respecting the substance, the situation, the motions, and all the different qualities of these heavens and stars; so that I thought I had said enough respecting them to show that there is nothing observable in the heavens or stars of our system that must not, or at least may not appear precisely alike in those of the system which I described. I came next to speak of the earth in particular, and to show how, even though I had expressly supposed that God had given no weight to the matter of which it is composed, this should not prevent all its parts from tending exactly to its center; how with water and air on its surface, the disposition of the heavens and heavenly bodies, more especially of the moon, must cause a flow and ebb, like in all its circumstances to that observed in our seas, as also a certain current both of water and air from east to west, such as is likewise observed between the tropics; how the mountains, seas, fountains, and rivers might naturally be formed in it, and the metals produced in the mines, and the plants grow in the fields and in general, how all the bodies which are commonly denominated mixed or composite might be generated and, among other things in the discoveries alluded to inasmuch as besides the stars, I knew nothing except fire which produces light, I spared no pains to set forth all that pertains to its nature,—the manner of its production and support, and to explain how heat is sometimes found without light, and light without heat; to show how it can induce various colors upon different bodies and other diverse qualities; how it reduces some to a liquid state and hardens others; how it can consume almost all bodies, or convert them into ashes and smoke; and finally, how from these ashes, by the mere intensity of its action, it forms glass: for as this transmutation of ashes into glass appeared to me as wonderful as any other in nature, I took a special pleasure in describing it. I was not, however, disposed, from these circumstances, to conclude that this world had been created in the manner I described; for it is much more likely that God made it at the first such as it was to be. But this is certain, and an opinion commonly received among theologians, that the action by which he now sustains it is the same with that by which he originally created it; so that even although he had from the beginning given it no other form than that of chaos, provided only he had established certain laws of nature, and had lent it his concurrence to enable it to act as it is wont to do, it may be believed, without discredit to the miracle of creation, that, in this way alone, things purely material might, in course of time, have become such as we observe them at present; and their nature is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming in this manner gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced at once in a finished and perfect state.

From the description of inanimate bodies and plants, I passed to animals, and particularly to man. But since I had not as yet sufficient knowledge to enable me to treat of these in the same manner as of the rest, that is to say, by deducing effects from their causes, and by showing from what elements and in what manner nature must produce them, I remained satisfied with the supposition that God formed the body of man wholly like to one of ours, as well in the external shape of the members as in the internal conformation of the organs, of the same matter with that I had described, and at first placed in it no rational soul, nor any other principle, in room of the vegetative or sensitive soul, beyond kindling in the heart one of those fires without light, such as I had already described, and which I thought was not different from the heat in hay that has been heaped together before it is dry, or that which causes fermentation in new wines before they are run clear of the fruit. For, when I examined the kind of functions which might, as consequences of this supposition, exist in this body, I found precisely all those which may exist in us independently of all power of thinking, and consequently without being in any measure owing to the soul; in other words, to that part of us which is distinct from the body, and of which it has been said above that the nature distinctively consists in thinking, functions in which the animals void of reason may be said wholly to resemble us; but among which I could not discover any of those that, as dependent on thought alone, belong to us as men, while, on the other hand, I did afterwards discover these as soon as I supposed God to have created a rational soul, and to have annexed it to this body in a particular manner which I described.

But, in order to show how I there handled this matter, I mean here to give the explication of the motion of the heart and arteries, which, as the first and most general motion observed in animals, will afford the means of readily determining what should be thought of all the rest. And that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I am about to say on this subject, I advise those who are not versed in anatomy, before they commence the perusal of these observations, to take the trouble of getting dissected in their presence the heart of some large animal possessed of lungs (for this is throughout sufficiently like the human), and to have shown to them its two ventricles or cavities: in the first place, that in the right side, with which correspond two very ample tubes, viz., the hollow vein (vena cava), which is the principal receptacle of the blood, and the trunk of the tree, as it were, of which all the other veins in the body are branches; and the arterial vein (vena arteriosa), inappropriately so denominated, since it is in truth only an artery, which, taking its rise in the heart, is divided, after passing out from it, into many branches which presently disperse themselves all over the lungs; in the second place, the cavity in the left side, with which correspond in the same manner two canals in size equal to or larger than the preceding, viz., the venous artery (arteria venosa), likewise inappropriately thus designated, because it is simply a vein which comes from the lungs, where it is divided into many branches, interlaced with those of the arterial vein, and those of the tube called the windpipe, through which the air we breathe enters; and the great artery which, issuing from the heart, sends its branches all over the body. I should wish also that such persons were carefully shown the eleven pellicles which, like so many small valves, open and shut the four orifices that are in these two cavities, viz., three at the entrance of the hollow veins where they are disposed in such a manner as by no means to prevent the blood which it contains from flowing into the right ventricle of the heart, and yet exactly to prevent its flowing out; three at the entrance to the arterial vein, which, arranged in a manner exactly the opposite of the former, readily permit the blood contained in this cavity to pass into the lungs, but hinder that contained in the lungs from returning to this cavity; and, in like manner, two others at the mouth of the venous artery, which allow the blood from the lungs to flow into the left cavity of the heart, but preclude its return; and three at the mouth of the great artery, which suffer the blood to flow from the heart, but prevent its reflux. Nor do we need to seek any other reason for the number of these pellicles beyond this that the orifice of the venous artery being of an oval shape from the nature of its situation, can be adequately closed with two, whereas the others being round are more conveniently closed with three. Besides, I wish such persons to observe that the grand artery and the arterial vein are of much harder and firmer texture than the venous artery and the hollow vein; and that the two last expand before entering the heart, and there form, as it were, two pouches denominated the auricles of the heart, which are composed of a substance similar to that of the heart itself; and that there is always more warmth in the heart than in any other part of the body—and finally, that this heat is capable of causing any drop of blood that passes into the cavities rapidly to expand and dilate, just as all liquors do when allowed to fall drop by drop into a highly heated vessel.

For, after these things, it is not necessary for me to say anything more with a view to explain the motion of the heart, except that when its cavities are not full of blood, into these the blood of necessity flows—from the hollow vein into the right, and from the venous artery into the left; because these two vessels are always full of blood, and their orifices, which are turned towards the heart, cannot then be closed. But as soon as two drops of blood have thus passed, one into each of the cavities, these drops which cannot but be very large, because the orifices through which they pass are wide, and the vessels from which they come full of blood, are immediately rarefied, and dilated by the heat they meet with. In this way they cause the whole heart to expand, and at the same time press home and shut the five small valves that are at the entrances of the two vessels from which they flow, and thus prevent any more blood from coming down into the heart, and becoming more and more rarefied, they push open the six small valves that are in the orifices of the other two vessels, through which they pass out, causing in this way all the branches of the arterial vein and of the grand artery to expand almost simultaneously with the heart which immediately thereafter begins to contract, as do also the arteries, because the blood that has entered them has cooled, and the six small valves close, and the five of the hollow vein and of the venous artery open anew and allow a passage to other two drops of blood, which cause the heart and the arteries again to expand as before. And, because the blood which thus enters into the heart passes through these two pouches called auricles, it thence happens that their motion is the contrary of that of the heart, and that when it expands they contract. But lest those who are ignorant of the force of mathematical demonstrations and who are not accustomed to distinguish true reasons from mere verisimilitudes, should venture without examination, to deny what has been said, I wish it to be considered that the motion which I have now explained follows as necessarily from the very arrangement of the parts, which may be observed in the heart by the eye alone, and from the heat which may be felt with the fingers, and from the nature of the blood as learned from experience, as does the motion of a clock from the power, the situation, and shape of its counterweights and wheels.

But if it be asked how it happens that the blood in the veins, flowing in this way continually into the heart, is not exhausted, and why the arteries do not become too full, since all the blood which passes through the heart flows into them, I need only mention in reply what has been written by a physician of England, who has the honor of having broken the ice on this subject, and of having been the first to teach that there are many small passages at the extremities of the arteries, through which the blood received by them from the heart passes into the small branches of the veins, whence it again returns to the heart; so that its course amounts precisely to a perpetual circulation. Of this we have abundant proof in the ordinary experience of surgeons, who, by binding the arm with a tie of moderate straitness above the part where they open the vein, cause the blood to flow more copiously than it would have done without any ligature; whereas quite the contrary would happen were they to bind it below; that is, between the hand and the opening, or were to make the ligature above the opening very tight. For it is manifest that the tie, moderately straightened, while adequate to hinder the blood already in the arm from returning towards the heart by the veins, cannot on that account prevent new blood from coming forward through the arteries, because these are situated below the veins, and their coverings, from their greater consistency, are more difficult to compress; and also that the blood which comes from the heart tends to pass through them to the hand with greater force than it does to return from the hand to the heart through the veins. And since the latter current escapes from the arm by the opening made in one of the veins, there must of necessity be certain passages below the ligature, that is, towards the extremities of the arm through which it can come thither from the arteries. This physician likewise abundantly establishes what he has advanced respecting the motion of the blood, from the existence of certain pellicles, so disposed in various places along the course of the veins, in the manner of small valves, as not to permit the blood to pass from the middle of the body towards the extremities, but only to return from the extremities to the heart; and farther, from experience which shows that all the blood which is in the body may flow out of it in a very short time through a single artery that has been cut, even although this had been closely tied in the immediate neighborhood of the heart and cut between the heart and the ligature, so as to prevent the supposition that the blood flowing out of it could come from any other quarter than the heart.

But there are many other circumstances which evince that what I have alleged is the true cause of the motion of the blood: thus, in the first place, the difference that is observed between the blood which flows from the veins, and that from the arteries, can only arise from this, that being rarefied, and, as it were, distilled by passing through the heart, it is thinner, and more vivid, and warmer immediately after leaving the heart, in other words, when in the arteries, than it was a short time before passing into either, in other words, when it was in the veins; and if attention be given, it will be found that this difference is very marked only in the neighborhood of the heart; and is not so evident in parts more remote from it. In the next place, the consistency of the coats of which the arterial vein and the great artery are composed, sufficiently shows that the blood is impelled against them with more force than against the veins. And why should the left cavity of the heart and the great artery be wider and larger than the right cavity and the arterial vein, were it not that the blood of the venous artery, having only been in the lungs after it has passed through the heart, is thinner, and rarefies more readily, and in a higher degree, than the blood which proceeds immediately from the hollow vein? And what can physicians conjecture from feeling the pulse unless they know that according as the blood changes its nature it can be rarefied by the warmth of the heart, in a higher or lower degree, and more or less quickly than before? And if it be inquired how this heat is communicated to the other members, must it not be admitted that this is effected by means of the blood, which, passing through the heart, is there heated anew, and thence diffused over all the body? Whence it happens, that if the blood be withdrawn from any part, the heat is likewise withdrawn by the same means; and although the heart were as hot as glowing iron, it would not be capable of warming the feet and hands as at present, unless it continually sent thither new blood. We likewise perceive from this, that the true use of respiration is to bring sufficient fresh air into the lungs, to cause the blood which flows into them from the right ventricle of the heart, where it has been rarefied and, as it were, changed into vapors, to become thick, and to convert it anew into blood, before it flows into the left cavity, without which process it would be unfit for the nourishment of the fire that is there. This receives confirmation from the circumstance, that it is observed of animals destitute of lungs that they have also but one cavity in the heart, and that in children who cannot use them while in the womb, there is a hole through which the blood flows from the hollow vein into the left cavity of the heart, and a tube through which it passes from the arterial vein into the grand artery without passing through the lung. In the next place, how could digestion be carried on in the stomach unless the heart communicated heat to it through the arteries, and along with this certain of the more fluid parts of the blood, which assist in the dissolution of the food that has been taken in? Is not also the operation which converts the juice of food into blood easily comprehended, when it is considered that it is distilled by passing and repassing through the heart perhaps more than one or two hundred times in a day? And what more need be adduced to explain nutrition, and the production of the different humors of the body, beyond saying, that the force with which the blood, in being rarefied, passes from the heart towards the extremities of the arteries, causes certain of its parts to remain in the members at which they arrive, and there occupy the place of some others expelled by them; and that according to the situation, shape, or smallness of the pores with which they meet, some rather than others flow into certain parts, in the same way that some sieves are observed to act, which, by being variously perforated, serve to separate different species of grain? And, in the last place, what above all is here worthy of observation, is the generation of the animal spirits, which are like a very subtle wind, or rather a very pure and vivid flame which, continually ascending in great abundance from the heart to the brain, thence penetrates through the nerves into the muscles, and gives motion to all the members; so that to account for other parts of the blood which, as most agitated and penetrating, are the fittest to compose these spirits, proceeding towards the brain, it is not necessary to suppose any other cause, than simply, that the arteries which carry them thither proceed from the heart in the most direct lines, and that, according to the rules of mechanics which are the same with those of nature, when many objects tend at once to the same point where there is not sufficient room for all (as is the case with the parts of the blood which flow forth from the left cavity of the heart and tend towards the brain), the weaker and less agitated parts must necessarily be driven aside from that point by the stronger which alone in this way reach it I had expounded all these matters with sufficient minuteness in the treatise which I formerly thought of publishing. And after these, I had shown what must be the fabric of the nerves and muscles of the human body to give the animal spirits contained in it the power to move the members, as when we see heads shortly after they have been struck off still move and bite the earth, although no longer animated; what changes must take place in the brain to produce waking, sleep, and dreams; how light, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, and all the other qualities of external objects impress it with different ideas by means of the senses; how hunger, thirst, and the other internal affections can likewise impress upon it divers ideas; what must be understood by the common sense (sensus communis) in which these ideas are received, by the memory which retains them, by the fantasy which can change them in various ways, and out of them compose new ideas, and which, by the same means, distributing the animal spirits through the muscles, can cause the members of such a body to move in as many different ways, and in a manner as suited, whether to the objects that are presented to its senses or to its internal affections, as can take place in our own case apart from the guidance of the will. Nor will this appear at all strange to those who are acquainted with the variety of movements performed by the different automata, or moving machines fabricated by human industry, and that with help of but few pieces compared with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins, and other parts that are found in the body of each animal. Such persons will look upon this body as a machine made by the hands of God, which is incomparably better arranged, and adequate to movements more admirable than is any machine of human invention. And here I specially stayed to show that, were there such machines exactly resembling organs and outward form an ape or any other irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a different nature from these animals; but if there were machines bearing the image of our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far as it is morally possible, there would still remain two most certain tests whereby to know that they were not therefore really men. Of these the first is that they could never use words or other signs arranged in such a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others: for we may easily conceive a machine to be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits some correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which cause a change in its organs; for example, if touched in a particular place it may demand what we wish to say to it; if in another it may cry out that it is hurt, and such like; but not that it should arrange them variously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the lowest grade of intellect can do. The second test is, that although such machines might execute many things with equal or perhaps greater perfection than any of us, they would, without doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be discovered that they did not act from knowledge, but solely from the disposition of their organs: for while reason is an universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, these organs, on the contrary, need a particular arrangement for each particular action; whence it must be morally impossible that there should exist in any machine a diversity of organs sufficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life, in the way in which our reason enables us to act. Again, by means of these two tests we may likewise know the difference between men and brutes. For it is highly deserving of remark, that there are no men so dull and stupid, not even idiots, as to be incapable of joining together different words, and thereby constructing a declaration by which to make their thoughts understood; and that on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect or happily circumstanced, which can do the like. Nor does this inability arise from want of organs: for we observe that magpies and parrots can utter words like ourselves, and are yet unable to speak as we do, that is, so as to show that they understand what they say; in place of which men born deaf and dumb, and thus not less, but rather more than the brutes, destitute of the organs which others use in speaking, are in the habit of spontaneously inventing certain signs by which they discover their thoughts to those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to learn their language. And this proves not only that the brutes have less reason than man, but that they have none at all: for we see that very little is required to enable a person to speak; and since a certain inequality of capacity is observable among animals of the same species, as well as among men, and since some are more capable of being instructed than others, it is incredible that the most perfect ape or parrot of its species, should not in this be equal to the most stupid infant of its kind or at least to one that was crack-brained, unless the soul of brutes were of a nature wholly different from ours. And we ought not to confound speech with the natural movements which indicate the passions, and can be imitated by machines as well as manifested by animals; nor must it be thought with certain of the ancients, that the brutes speak, although we do not understand their language. For if such were the case, since they are endowed with many organs analogous to ours, they could as easily communicate their thoughts to us as to their fellows. It is also very worthy of remark, that, though there are many animals which manifest more industry than we in certain of their actions, the same animals are yet observed to show none at all in many others: so that the circumstance that they do better than we does not prove that they are endowed with mind, for it would thence follow that they possessed greater reason than any of us, and could surpass us in all things; on the contrary, it rather proves that they are destitute of reason, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs: thus it is seen, that a clock composed only of wheels and weights can number the hours and measure time more exactly than we with all our skin.

I had after this described the reasonable soul, and shown that it could by no means be educed from the power of matter, as the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created; and that it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members, but that it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours, and thus constitute a real man. I here entered, in conclusion, upon the subject of the soul at considerable length, because it is of the greatest moment: for after the error of those who deny the existence of God, an error which I think I have already sufficiently refuted, there is none that is more powerful in leading feeble minds astray from the straight path of virtue than the supposition that the soul of the brutes is of the same nature with our own; and consequently that after this life we have nothing to hope for or fear, more than flies and ants; in place of which, when we know how far they differ we much better comprehend the reasons which establish that the soul is of a nature wholly independent of the body, and that consequently it is not liable to die with the latter and, finally, because no other causes are observed capable of destroying it, we are naturally led thence to judge that it is immortal.

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Part VI

Three years have now elapsed since I finished the treatise containing all these matters; and I was beginning to revise it, with the view to put it into the hands of a printer, when I learned that persons to whom I greatly defer, and whose authority over my actions is hardly less influential than is my own reason over my thoughts, had condemned a certain doctrine in physics, published a short time previously by another individual to which I will not say that I adhered, but only that, previously to their censure I had observed in it nothing which I could imagine to be prejudicial either to religion or to the state, and nothing therefore which would have prevented me from giving expression to it in writing, if reason had persuaded me of its truth; and this led me to fear lest among my own doctrines likewise some one might be found in which I had departed from the truth, notwithstanding the great care I have always taken not to accord belief to new opinions of which I had not the most certain demonstrations, and not to give expression to aught that might tend to the hurt of any one. This has been sufficient to make me alter my purpose of publishing them; for although the reasons by which I had been induced to take this resolution were very strong, yet my inclination, which has always been hostile to writing books, enabled me immediately to discover other considerations sufficient to excuse me for not undertaking the task. And these reasons, on one side and the other, are such, that not only is it in some measure my interest here to state them, but that of the public, perhaps, to know them.

I have never made much account of what has proceeded from my own mind; and so long as I gathered no other advantage from the method I employ beyond satisfying myself on some difficulties belonging to the speculative sciences, or endeavoring to regulate my actions according to the principles it taught me, I never thought myself bound to publish anything respecting it. For in what regards manners, every one is so full of his own wisdom, that there might be found as many reformers as heads, if any were allowed to take upon themselves the task of mending them, except those whom God has constituted the supreme rulers of his people or to whom he has given sufficient grace and zeal to be prophets; and although my speculations greatly pleased myself, I believed that others had theirs, which perhaps pleased them still more. But as soon as I had acquired some general notions respecting physics, and beginning to make trial of them in various particular difficulties, had observed how far they can carry us, and how much they differ from the principles that have been employed up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without sinning grievously against the law by which we are bound to promote, as far as in us lies, the general good of mankind. For by them I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in life; and in room of the speculative philosophy usually taught in the schools, to discover a practical, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature. And this is a result to be desired, not only in order to the invention of an infinity of arts, by which we might be enabled to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth, and all its comforts, but also and especially for the preservation of health, which is without doubt, of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental one; for the mind is so intimately dependent upon the condition and relation of the organs of the body, that if any means can ever be found to render men wiser and more ingenious than hitherto, I believe that it is in medicine they must be sought for. It is true that the science of medicine, as it now exists, contains few things whose utility is very remarkable: but without any wish to depreciate it, I am confident that there is no one, even among those whose profession it is, who does not admit that all at present known in it is almost nothing in comparison of what remains to be discovered; and that we could free ourselves from an infinity of maladies of body as well as of mind, and perhaps also even from the debility of age, if we had sufficiently ample knowledge of their causes, and of all the remedies provided for us by nature. But since I designed to employ my whole life in the search after so necessary a science, and since I had fallen in with a path which seems to me such, that if any one follow it he must inevitably reach the end desired, unless he be hindered either by the shortness of life or the want of experiments, I judged that there could be no more effectual provision against these two impediments than if I were faithfully to communicate to the public all the little I might myself have found, and incite men of superior genius to strive to proceed farther, by contributing, each according to his inclination and ability, to the experiments which it would be necessary to make, and also by informing the public of all they might discover, so that, by the last beginning where those before them had left off, and thus connecting the lives and labours of many, we might collectively proceed much farther than each by himself could do.

I remarked, moreover, with respect to experiments, that they become always more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge; for, at the commencement, it is better to make use only of what is spontaneously presented to our senses, and of which we cannot remain ignorant, provided we bestow on it any reflection, however slight, than to concern ourselves about more uncommon and recondite phenomena: the reason of which is, that the more uncommon often only mislead us so long as the causes of the more ordinary are still unknown; and the circumstances upon which they depend are almost always so special and minute as to be highly difficult to detect. But in this I have adopted the following order: first, I have essayed to find in general the principles, or first causes of all that is or can be in the world, without taking into consideration for this end anything but God himself who has created it, and without educing them from any other source than from certain germs of truths naturally existing in our minds. In the second place, I examined what were the first and most ordinary effects that could be deduced from these causes; and it appears to me that, in this way, I have found heavens, stars, an earth, and even on the earth water, air, fire, minerals, and some other things of this kind, which of all others are the most common and simple, and hence the easiest to know. Afterwards when I wished to descend to the more particular, so many diverse objects presented themselves to me, that I believed it to be impossible for the human mind to distinguish the forms or species of bodies that are upon the earth, from an infinity of others which might have been, if it had pleased God to place them there, or consequently to apply them to our use, unless we rise to causes through their effects, and avail ourselves of many particular experiments. Thereupon, turning over in my mind I the objects that had ever been presented to my senses I freely venture to state that I have never observed any which I could not satisfactorily explain by the principles had discovered. But it is necessary also to confess that the power of nature is so ample and vast, and these principles so simple and general, that I have hardly observed a single particular effect which I cannot at once recognize as capable of being deduced in man different modes from the principles, and that my greatest difficulty usually is to discover in which of these modes the effect is dependent upon them; for out of this difficulty cannot otherwise extricate myself than by again seeking certain experiments, which may be such that their result is not the same, if it is in the one of these modes at we must explain it, as it would be if it were to be explained in the other. As to what remains, I am now in a position to discern, as I think, with sufficient clearness what course must be taken to make the majority those experiments which may conduce to this end: but I perceive likewise that they are such and so numerous, that neither my hands nor my income, though it were a thousand times larger than it is, would be sufficient for them all; so that according as henceforward I shall have the means of making more or fewer experiments, I shall in the same proportion make greater or less progress in the knowledge of nature. This was what I had hoped to make known by the treatise I had written, and so clearly to exhibit the advantage that would thence accrue to the public, as to induce all who have the common good of man at heart, that is, all who are virtuous in truth, and not merely in appearance, or according to opinion, as well to communicate to me the experiments they had already made, as to assist me in those that remain to be made.

But since that time other reasons have occurred to me, by which I have been led to change my opinion, and to think that I ought indeed to go on committing to writing all the results which I deemed of any moment, as soon as I should have tested their truth, and to bestow the same care upon them as I would have done had it been my design to publish them. This course commended itself to me, as well because I thus afforded myself more ample inducement to examine them thoroughly, for doubtless that is always more narrowly scrutinized which we believe will be read by many, than that which is written merely for our private use (and frequently what has seemed to me true when I first conceived it, has appeared false when I have set about committing it to writing), as because I thus lost no opportunity of advancing the interests of the public, as far as in me lay, and since thus likewise, if my writings possess any value, those into whose hands they may fall after my death may be able to put them to what use they deem proper. But I resolved by no means to consent to their publication during my lifetime, lest either the oppositions or the controversies to which they might give rise, or even the reputation, such as it might be, which they would acquire for me, should be any occasion of my losing the time that I had set apart for my own improvement. For though it be true that every one is bound to promote to the extent of his ability the good of others, and that to be useful to no one is really to be worthless, yet it is likewise true that our cares ought to extend beyond the present, and it is good to omit doing what might perhaps bring some profit to the living, when we have in view the accomplishment of other ends that will be of much greater advantage to posterity. And in truth, I am quite willing it should be known that the little I have hitherto learned is almost nothing in comparison with that of which I am ignorant, and to the knowledge of which I do not despair of being able to attain; for it is much the same with those who gradually discover truth in the sciences, as with those who when growing rich find less difficulty in making great acquisitions, than they formerly experienced when poor in making acquisitions of much smaller amount. Or they may be compared to the commanders of armies, whose forces usually increase in proportion to their victories, and who need greater prudence to keep together the residue of their troops after a defeat than after a victory to take towns and provinces. For he truly engages in battle who endeavors to surmount all the difficulties and errors which prevent him from reaching the knowledge of truth, and he is overcome in fight who admits a false opinion touching a matter of any generality and importance, and he requires thereafter much more skill to recover his former position than to make great advances when once in possession of thoroughly ascertained principles. As for myself, if I have succeeded in discovering any truths in the sciences (and I trust that what is contained in this volume 1 will show that I have found some), I can declare that they are but the consequences and results of five or six principal difficulties which I have surmounted, and my encounters with which I reckoned as battles in which victory declared for me. I will not hesitate even to avow my belief that nothing further is wanting to enable me fully to realize my designs than to gain two or three similar victories; and that I am not so far advanced in years but that, according to the ordinary course of nature, I may still have sufficient leisure for this end. But I conceive myself the more bound to husband the time that remains the greater my expectation of being able to employ it aright, and I should doubtless have much to rob me of it, were I to publish the principles of my physics: for although they are almost all so evident that to assent to them no more is needed than simply to understand them, and although there is not one of them of which I do not expect to be able to give demonstration, yet, as it is impossible that they can be in accordance with all the diverse opinions of others, I foresee that I should frequently be turned aside from my grand design, on occasion of the opposition which they would be sure to awaken.

It may be said, that these oppositions would be useful both in making me aware of my errors, and, if my speculations contain anything of value, in bringing others to a fuller understanding of it; and still farther, as many can see better than one, in leading others who are now beginning to avail themselves of my principles, to assist me in turn with their discoveries. But though I recognize my extreme liability to error, and scarce ever trust to the first thoughts which occur to me, yet the experience I have had of possible objections to my views prevents me from anticipating any profit from them. For I have already had frequent proof of the judgments, as well of those I esteemed friends, as of some others to whom I thought I was an object of indifference, and even of some whose malignancy and envy would, I knew, determine them to endeavor to discover what partiality concealed from the eyes of my friends. But it has rarely happened that anything has been objected to me which I had myself altogether overlooked, unless it were something far removed from the subject: so that I have never met with a single critic of my opinions who did not appear to me either less rigorous or less equitable than myself. And further, I have never observed that any truth before unknown has been brought to light by the disputations that are practised in the schools; for while each strives for the victory, each is much more occupied in making the best of mere verisimilitude, than in weighing the reasons on both sides of the question; and those who have been long good advocates are not afterwards on that account the better judges.

As for the advantage that others would derive from the communication of my thoughts, it could not be very great; because I have not yet so far prosecuted them as that much does not remain to be added before they can be applied to practice. And I think I may say without vanity, that if there is any one who can carry them out that length, it must be myself rather than another: not that there may not be in the world many minds incomparably superior to mine, but because one cannot so well seize a thing and make it one's own, when it has been learned from another, as when one has himself discovered it. And so true is this of the present subject that, though I have often explained some of my opinions to persons of much acuteness, who, whilst I was speaking, appeared to understand them very distinctly, yet, when they repeated them, I have observed that they almost always changed them to such an extent that I could no longer acknowledge them as mine. I am glad, by the way, to take this opportunity of requesting posterity never to believe on hearsay that anything has proceeded from me which has not been published by myself; and I am not at all astonished at the extravagances attributed to those ancient philosophers whose own writings we do not possess; whose thoughts, however, I do not on that account suppose to have been really absurd, seeing they were among the ablest men of their times, but only that these have been falsely represented to us. It is observable, accordingly, that scarcely in a single instance has any one of their disciples surpassed them; and I am quite sure that the most devoted of the present followers of Aristotle would think themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he possessed, were it even under the condition that they should never afterwards attain to higher. In this respect they are like the ivy which never strives to rise above the tree that sustains it, and which frequently even returns downwards when it has reached the top; for it seems to me that they also sink, in other words, render themselves less wise than they would be if they gave up study, who, not contented with knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author, desire in addition to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says not a word, and never perhaps so much as thought. Their fashion of philosophizing, however, is well suited to persons whose abilities fall below mediocrity; for the obscurity of the distinctions and principles of which they make use enables them to speak of all things with as much confidence as if they really knew them, and to defend all that they say on any subject against the most subtle and skillful, without its being possible for any one to convict them of error. In this they seem to me to be like a blind man, who, in order to fight on equal terms with a person that sees, should have made him descend to the bottom of an intensely dark cave: and I may say that such persons have an interest in my refraining from publishing the principles of the philosophy of which I make use; for, since these are of a kind the simplest and most evident, I should, by publishing them, do much the same as if I were to throw open the windows, and allow the light of day to enter the cave into which the combatants had descended. But even superior men have no reason for any great anxiety to know these principles, for if what they desire is to be able to speak of all things, and to acquire a reputation for learning, they will gain their end more easily by remaining satisfied with the appearance of truth, which can be found without much difficulty in all sorts of matters, than by seeking the truth itself which unfolds itself but slowly and that only in some departments, while it obliges us, when we have to speak of others, freely to confess our ignorance. If, however, they prefer the knowledge of some few truths to the vanity of appearing ignorant of none, as such knowledge is undoubtedly much to be preferred, and, if they choose to follow a course similar to mine, they do not require for this that I should say anything more than I have already said in this discourse. For if they are capable of making greater advancement than I have made, they will much more be able of themselves to discover all that I believe myself to have found; since as I have never examined aught except in order, it is certain that what yet remains to be discovered is in itself more difficult and recondite, than that which I have already been enabled to find, and the gratification would be much less in learning it from me than in discovering it for themselves. Besides this, the habit which they will acquire, by seeking first what is easy, and then passing onward slowly and step by step to the more difficult, will benefit them more than all my instructions. Thus, in my own case, I am persuaded that if I had been taught from my youth all the truths of which I have since sought out demonstrations, and had thus learned them without labour, I should never, perhaps, have known any beyond these; at least, I should never have acquired the habit and the facility which I think I possess in always discovering new truths in proportion as I give myself to the search. And, in a single word, if there is any work in the world which cannot be so well finished by another as by him who has commenced it, it is that at which I labour.

It is true, indeed, as regards the experiments which may conduce to this end, that one man is not equal to the task of making them all; but yet he can advantageously avail himself, in this work, of no hands besides his own, unless those of artisans, or parties of the same kind, whom he could pay, and whom the hope of gain (a means of great efficacy) might stimulate to accuracy in the performance of what was prescribed to them. For as to those who, through curiosity or a desire of learning, of their own accord, perhaps, offer him their services, besides that in general their promises exceed their performance, and that they sketch out fine designs of which not one is ever realized, they will, without doubt, expect to be compensated for their trouble by the explication of some difficulties, or, at least, by compliments and useless speeches, in which he cannot spend any portion of his time without loss to himself. And as for the experiments that others have already made, even although these parties should be willing of themselves to communicate them to him (which is what those who esteem them secrets will never do), the experiments are, for the most part, accompanied with so many circumstances and superfluous elements, as to make it exceedingly difficult to disentangle the truth from its adjuncts—besides, he will find almost all of them so ill described, or even so false (because those who made them have wished to see in them only such facts as they deemed conformable to their principles), that, if in the entire number there should be some of a nature suited to his purpose, still their value could not compensate for the time what would be necessary to make the selection. So that if there existed any one whom we assuredly knew to be capable of making discoveries of the highest kind, and of the greatest possible utility to the public; and if all other men were therefore eager by all means to assist him in successfully prosecuting his designs, I do not see that they could do aught else for him beyond contributing to defray the expenses of the experiments that might be necessary; and for the rest, prevent his being deprived of his leisure by the unseasonable interruptions of any one. But besides that I neither have so high an opinion of myself as to be willing to make promise of anything extraordinary, nor feed on imaginations so vain as to fancy that the public must be much interested in my designs; I do not, on the other hand, own a soul so mean as to be capable of accepting from any one a favor of which it could be supposed that I was unworthy.

These considerations taken together were the reason why, for the last three years, I have been unwilling to publish the treatise I had on hand, and why I even resolved to give publicity during my life to no other that was so general, or by which the principles of my physics might be understood. But since then, two other reasons have come into operation that have determined me here to subjoin some particular specimens, and give the public some account of my doings and designs. Of these considerations, the first is, that if I failed to do so, many who were cognizant of my previous intention to publish some writings, might have imagined that the reasons which induced me to refrain from so doing, were less to my credit than they really are; for although I am not immoderately desirous of glory, or even, if I may venture so to say, although I am averse from it in so far as I deem it hostile to repose which I hold in greater account than aught else, yet, at the same time, I have never sought to conceal my actions as if they were crimes, nor made use of many precautions that I might remain unknown; and this partly because I should have thought such a course of conduct a wrong against myself, and partly because it would have occasioned me some sort of uneasiness which would again have been contrary to the perfect mental tranquillity which I court. And forasmuch as, while thus indifferent to the thought alike of fame or of forgetfulness, I have yet been unable to prevent myself from acquiring some sort of reputation, I have thought it incumbent on me to do my best to save myself at least from being ill-spoken of. The other reason that has determined me to commit to writing these specimens of philosophy is, that I am becoming daily more and more alive to the delay which my design of self-instruction suffers, for want of the infinity of experiments I require, and which it is impossible for me to make without the assistance of others: and, without flattering myself so much as to expect the public to take a large share in my interests, I am yet unwilling to be found so far wanting in the duty I owe to myself, as to give occasion to those who shall survive me to make it matter of reproach against me some day, that I might have left them many things in a much more perfect state than I have done, had I not too much neglected to make them aware of the ways in which they could have promoted the accomplishment of my designs.

And I thought that it was easy for me to select some matters which should neither be obnoxious to much controversy, nor should compel me to expound more of my principles than I desired, and which should yet be sufficient clearly to exhibit what I can or cannot accomplish in the sciences. Whether or not I have succeeded in this it is not for me to say; and I do not wish to forestall the judgments of others by speaking myself of my writings; but it will gratify me if they be examined, and, to afford the greater inducement to this I request all who may have any objections to make to them, to take the trouble of forwarding these to my publisher, who will give me notice of them, that I may endeavor to subjoin at the same time my reply; and in this way readers seeing both at once will more easily determine where the truth lies; for I do not engage in any case to make prolix replies, but only with perfect frankness to avow my errors if I am convinced of them, or if I cannot perceive them, simply to state what I think is required for defense of the matters I have written, adding thereto no explication of any new matter that it may not be necessary to pass without end from one thing to another.

If some of the matters of which I have spoken in the beginning of the "Dioptrics" and "Meteorics" should offend at first sight, because I call them hypotheses and seem indifferent about giving proof of them, I request a patient and attentive reading of the whole, from which I hope those hesitating will derive satisfaction; for it appears to me that the reasonings are so mutually connected in these treatises, that, as the last are demonstrated by the first which are their causes, the first are in their turn demonstrated by the last which are their effects. Nor must it be imagined that I here commit the fallacy which the logicians call a circle; for since experience renders the majority of these effects most certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not serve so much to establish their reality as to explain their existence; but on the contrary, the reality of the causes is established by the reality of the effects. Nor have I called them hypotheses with any other end in view except that it may be known that I think I am able to deduce them from those first truths which I have already expounded; and yet that I have expressly determined not to do so, to prevent a certain class of minds from thence taking occasion to build some extravagant philosophy upon what they may take to be my principles, and my being blamed for it. I refer to those who imagine that they can master in a day all that another has taken twenty years to think out, as soon as he has spoken two or three words to them on the subject; or who are the more liable to error and the less capable of perceiving truth in very proportion as they are more subtle and lively. As to the opinions which are truly and wholly mine, I offer no apology for them as new—persuaded as I am that if their reasons be well considered they will be found to be so simple and so conformed, to common sense as to appear less extraordinary and less paradoxical than any others which can be held on the same subjects; nor do I even boast of being the earliest discoverer of any of them, but only of having adopted them, neither because they had nor because they had not been held by others, but solely because reason has convinced me of their truth.

Though artisans may not be able at once to execute the invention which is explained in the "Dioptrics," I do not think that any one on that account is entitled to condemn it; for since address and practice are required in order so to make and adjust the machines described by me as not to overlook the smallest particular, I should not be less astonished if they succeeded on the first attempt than if a person were in one day to become an accomplished performer on the guitar, by merely having excellent sheets of music set up before him. And if I write in French, which is the language of my country, in preference to Latin, which is that of my preceptors, it is because I expect that those who make use of their unprejudiced natural reason will be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed to the writings of the ancients only; and as for those who unite good sense with habits of study, whom alone I desire for judges, they will not, I feel assured, be so partial to Latin as to refuse to listen to my reasonings merely because I expound them in the vulgar tongue.

In conclusion, I am unwilling here to say anything very specific of the progress which I expect to make for the future in the sciences, or to bind myself to the public by any promise which I am not certain of being able to fulfill; but this only will I say, that I have resolved to devote what time I may still have to live to no other occupation than that of endeavoring to acquire some knowledge of Nature, which shall be of such a kind as to enable us therefrom to deduce rules in medicine of greater certainty than those at present in use; and that my inclination is so much opposed to all other pursuits, especially to such as cannot be useful to some without being hurtful to others, that if, by any circumstances, I had been constrained to engage in such, I do not believe that I should have been able to succeed. Of this I here make a public declaration, though well aware that it cannot serve to procure for me any consideration in the world, which, however, I do not in the least affect; and I shall always hold myself more obliged to those through whose favor I am permitted to enjoy my retirement without interruption than to any who might offer me the highest earthly preferments.

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第一部分

理智可谓是世间分配最为均匀的东西了。世人都自以为具有足够的理智，就连那些对其他一切都极难满意之人也从不会觉得自己理智不够而想要多得一点。在这一点上，不大可能所有人都错了，此种信念反倒证明那正确判断、辨别真伪之能力，即我们所说的理智或理性，乃是人类生来就均等的，没有差别可言；而彼此意见之不同，并非理性之多寡导致，只是我们各自的思维运用途径不同，所关注对象有别罢了。因此，单有聪明才智远远不够，会合理运用才是首要前提。大智者能为大善，亦能为大恶；行缓而遵循正道者，比之行疾而偏离正道者，进步不可同日而语。

至于我自己，我从未奢想自己才智胜于常人。相反，我常常希望自己能与其他一些人一样，思维敏锐而果断，想象清晰而明了，记忆充盈而持久。除此之外，我再想不到别的什么可以使才智趋于完美了。因为只有理性或理智才使我们之所以成为人，之所以异于禽兽，因而我相信理性或者理智在每个人身上都是完整无缺的。在这一点上，我也赞同哲学家们的惯常观点，即同一种属的个体之间只是偶有属性上存在多与少的区别，而形式与本质上并无多寡的差异。

然而，我可以毫不犹豫地说，我非常幸运，在早年便摸索出几条门径，促使我思索，得出一些准则，并由这些准则形成了一种思维方法。我想，凭借这种方法，我的知识会不断增长，逐步提高到我的平凡才智和短暂生命能够允许我达到的最高点。我已经由此获益良多，尽管我一贯贬抑自己，尽管我从哲学家的角度观察人间万象，发现世人皆在营营役役，但一切几乎尽归虚无、一无是处。因而我还是为在寻求真理的道路上所取得的进步感到无上满足，更觉得前途无量。在世上的所有行业中，如果说有一种是确实有益而重要的话，我相信那正是我所选择的这个行业。

当然，我也可能错了；也许只得到了些破铜烂铁，而我却当成黄金钻石了。我知道，身在局中，难免迷惘；也知道，友朋的褒奖之词，非常值得怀疑。不过在这篇谈话中，我还是将向大家详细讲述我所依循的方法和途径，并将我的生平加以描述，以使大家人人都可各抒己见，给予评判。这样，我可从众人的意见中获得启示，为我自己惯常使用的学习方法提供新的帮助。

在此，我并不打算教给大家某种方法，使大家只要遵循该法就能正确地运用自己的理性；我只是要告诉大家，我自己是怎样运用我的理性的。大凡以人师自居者，当然势必认定自己比别人高明，而一旦稍有差错，便自己遭受谴责。可是我这本小册子所写的只是一些传记性的东西，或许也可称为故事吧。其中除某些例子值得效仿之外，多半是不建议采用的。我希望，在对任何人都无害的情况下，能对一些人有益，也希望我的坦率能得到大家的些许赞同。

我自幼与书本为伍，经人教诲，相信“书中自有颜如玉，书中自有黄金屋”，因而我如饥似渴地学习。可等到我学业完成，按例毕业，继而跻身学者之林时，我的看法却完全改变了。因为我发现自己陷入了疑惑和谬误的漩涡之中，而于学问上毫无进步，只不过越来越发现自己的无知。而我当时就读的学校是欧洲最著名的学校之一，我认为，如果世界上真有博学之士的话，我所在的学校肯定是会有的。别人在那所学校里学习的课程，我悉数学完，而且我还不满足于实际所授的课程。那些被视为最稀奇古怪的学问之书，只要能找到的，我都尽数读完。我也知道别人对我的评价。我发现，没人觉得我不如其他同学，虽然有几个同学已经被选为我们老师的接班人了。总而言之，我觉得我们的时代人才辈出、俊杰如云，不亚于以往任何一个时代。这就使我毫无拘束地开始对其他所有人给出我自己的评判，并且得出结论：以前人们让我相信的那些十足可靠的学问，一个都不存在。

尽管如此，对学校的功课我依然十分崇敬。我深知，学校所开设的语言课程是通晓古书的必备工具；而寓言的优雅，可激发心灵；不朽的历史事迹，可提升素养，若能加以研习，则有助于明辨是非、英明善断；研习古今名著，犹如与历代著书先贤促膝畅谈，甚至探讨，从中所得皆为他们思想之精髓；而雄辩之术，气势磅礴，无与伦比；诗词歌赋，婉转缠绵，动人心弦；算术一科奥妙无比，缜密之发现满足了不少好奇之心，于其他诸学亦有推波助澜之功，于世人亦有减轻人力之效；伦理一科则著述甚丰，箴言、教训兼而有之，教人向上为善；神学一科指出人们入天堂之道；哲学给人秘籍——用浅显的真理谈论一切事情，并能令肤浅之人多生羡慕；法律医学以及其他学科给人盛名厚利。总而言之，博学旁通，不无好处，甚至对那些迷信虚妄之物，我们亦能判定其真正价值，避免上当受骗。

但是，我相信自己在语言学习上下的功夫已然足够，而且在阅读先贤著作以及探索先贤的历史事迹上也花费了足够多的时间。因为我发现，与不同时代的古人交流，就几乎如同旅行一样。知道一些异国风俗是有用的，如此能使我们对本国风俗作出更为恰当的评价，不至于像那些经历仅限于本国国内的人一样得出这样的结论：任何与本国风俗相反的事情都是可笑的、不合理的。另一方面，若旅行过久则会对我们本土生疏；对古人的风俗过于关注，则每每对当下的风俗无知。此外，虚构的故事使人想入非非，把许多不可能的事情想象成可能；而即使是最忠实的史书，如果没有完全歪曲、夸张史实，以求动听，至少也几乎总是删去了某些细枝末节，而不能尽如原貌。倘若以此为榜样亦步亦趋，每每会像传奇里的游侠骑士一样陷于浮夸，自恃能力无边、自我陶醉。

我非常崇拜雄辩之术，也挚爱诗词歌赋，但我总觉得这两者乃天赐之物，而非后天学习所能得来。那些推理能力极强，又最善于明晰敏巧地表达其思想的人，即使只会说下布列塔尼半岛地区的土话，且完全不懂修辞规则，也往往能说服别人，使人相信他们所说的是真理；而那些头脑中富有奇思妙想，又能用最妙辞藻表达之人，纵使不谙熟诗词韵律，也仍不失为一流诗人。

我特别喜爱数学，因为它推理确切明了，但我对它的真正用途却不甚明了。我以为它只用于机械技术，于是不禁惊叹：数学有如此牢固、如此坚实之基础，人类本应从其中孕育出更为骄傲之建树。相反，古之卫道士的长篇宏论，貌似高耸入云、富丽堂皇之宫殿，其实基石比泥沙还差。他们把美德捧得极高，说它们世上无物可比，却没有为我们给出一个确切的道德标准。而他们常常给这个美好的名字赋予的美德，不过是冷漠无情、骄傲自满、灰心丧气、弑父弑母罢了。

我也敬仰我们的神学，并同别人一样向往天堂。然而有人却肯定地告诉我，人不论无知还是博学，同样都能进天堂，而指引人升天的真理却不是我们所能理解的。于是我也不敢妄加推理，我认为唯有自天而降的特殊帮助和非凡资质，才能在神学研究方面有所成。

关于哲学，我只有以下要说的：据我观察，千百年来哲学问题经过无数仁人志士的探索，时至今日，依然没有一个是不存在争论的，也没有一个能免遭怀疑。因此，在哲学研究上，我当时并不希冀自己能比别人成功多少。此外，既然同一个问题只能有一个正确的看法，而往往又有若干意见彼此矛盾，还有博学之人支持，于是我把仅仅貌似正确的一概看成是错误的。

至于其他学科，既然它们的本原皆来自于哲学，我断定，基础如此不稳，必建不出什么坚实的屋宇来。所以，能由这些学问获得的名和利不足以促使我去研究。感谢上苍，我当时并非穷困潦倒，要靠学问去牟利，以求过上好日子。我虽不像犬儒派那样藐视荣誉，但对于那些只靠虚假头衔得来的名声却看得十分轻淡。总而言之，想到那些骗人的学说，徒令我对炼丹术者的包票、占星卜士的预言、魔术师的鬼把戏退避三舍，以防上当。对于那些自称内行，其实一无所知之人的装腔作势，我更是望而却步，以免受骗。

基于这些缘由，随着年龄渐长，我不再受师长的束缚，完全抛开了对书本的研究，并且立志，除自我或者大千世界这本大书之外，不再进行其他研究。于是趁着年轻，我就四处游历，走访宫廷和军队，与不同气质、不同身份的人交往，积累各种经验。在命运驱使我遇到的各种不同环境中考验自我。尤其是随时随地思考我所经历的事情，以保从中受益，不断进步。因为我发现，较之研究某位学者在其书房里的研究成果所获得的真理，对现实个体进行推理研究所获得的真理要多得多。因为，对于后一种情况，我们不仅会参考个体自身感兴趣的事件，还会参考如果个体判断失误，不久便会遭受惩罚的问题。学者研究的往往是些无关实际的思辨哲学，对自己毫无影响，而且，也许研究离常识越远，由此产生的虚荣心就越大，因为必须要花费更多心思，才能使那些空论变得更像真理。除此之外，我渴想学会辨别真假，以便可以认清人生正道，并且满怀自信，迈步向前。

诚然，在我专门考察其他国家的风俗习惯时，也没有发现使我确信的东西。他们自己也常常自相矛盾，一如一些哲学家对自己的观点不能自圆其说。我从研究中所得的最大好处就是眼界大开、见多识广。尽管有些风俗我们觉得离奇可笑，但却为其他伟大民族一致赞同、共同采纳。因此，我懂得了，不能一味听从那些成规惯例，只对它们坚信不移。就这样，我渐渐摒弃了许多错误观念。这些错误观念的力量非常大，足以蒙蔽我们天生的灵明，在很大程度上使我们无力听从理性。但在经过数年对大千世界这本书的研究并努力得到若干经验之后，我终于下定决心，把我自己作为研究对象，集中一切精力选择我应遵循的道路。这样做，比之不出国门或死抠书本，我觉得会更有成就。

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第二部分

那时，德国战乱尚未结束，我随部队驻扎在那里。观看完皇帝加冕仪式后，我回到部队。时令已入冬季，我便只好留在驻地。那里没有什么朋友和社交活动引起我的兴致，万幸又不受任何忧虑或激情的搅扰，我便整日深居简出，借此良机，独自思索。我首先想到的是，众人合力拼凑之作，比之一人独自完成之作，难得有非常完美之处。例如，通过观察可以发现，房屋楼宇的设计修造若是出自同一人之手，往往美观宽敞。若是经由多人修改，利用旧墙故壁以作他用，这样得来之建筑，往往要逊色很多。同样，一些原来只是村庄，经过长期发展逐渐变成大都会的古城，通常显得不够规整。与之相比，由某位专业建筑师自由设计，在开阔平原上建起的现代城镇则显得整齐规范。虽然，古城有一些建筑常常可以与现代城市的建筑相媲美，甚至美而过之，然而人们见到的古城往往房屋布局横七竖八、大小不一，街道弯弯曲曲、凹凸不平。人们由此就会觉得，这一切都是出于偶然，而非源自理性引导的人类意愿。若能想到这些，我们就很容易明白，各城历来都有专门官员来管理私人建筑，以便使其给城市增加美感，但结果都不够理想。可见,单单加工别人的东西是很难达到非常完美的。同样,我也常想到，一些民族原来处于半野蛮状态，以缓慢的速度渐渐进入文明，由于只是被一些特殊犯罪和争吵所累，不得已而不断地制定法律。他们的治理，与自始就遵奉贤明者立法之民族相比，稍欠完美。如此，可以非常肯定，真宗教之清规，乃由上帝得来之法令，相较于其他宗教，其优越性可说是无可比拟。进而说到人事，我认为，古代斯巴达之兴盛，并非因为其每一条法律都特别完善，因其法律实有许多极其古怪之条目，甚至有与良德相违背之处。其兴盛应归因于其法律全都出于一人之手，全都为了一个目的。我同时又想到，书本上之学问（至少那些貌似真理却无证据之学问），乃是由多人之不同意见拼凑而成。有天赋理智之人，以其自然无偏见之判断能力，根据自己之经验得出简单推论。相比而言，前者偏离真理很远。再者，我们全都经历过从幼儿到成人的过程，而且势必在很长一段时期，受个人欲望和师长之支配（而老师之指示常常相互矛盾，并且不见得每个师长的意见总是正确）。那么，我可以进一步得出结论，判断能总是正确可靠几乎不可能，除非我们生来就有成熟之理智，并且能一直仅被它所引导。

诚然，仅为街道美观而将全城房屋一概拆毁，依新设计重建，这样的事不太常见。但是，私人把自己的房屋拆毁，重新建造，也有时为了避免房屋因日久坍塌，或者恐怕根基不稳，不得不将房屋拆而重建，这样的事却是常见的。以此为例，我明白了，个人想要用彻底改变、推翻重建的方法来改造国家，的确是荒唐妄想。我以为，任何与此相似的意在改造各门学科的实体或者在学校讲授这些学问固有规则的计划，同样是荒谬无比的。但是，说到多年来我所信奉之观点，我认为，倒不如立刻把他们扫除殆尽，以便采纳更好之见解，抑或将原有之观念经过理性思考后收回重用。我坚信，用这种方法引导生活，比之仅仅固守陈旧基础，一味依赖年轻时轻信的那些原则的方法，一定会取得更大的成功。因为，我知道，如此行事虽然困难重重，但也并非无法克服，也不像改革公众事务那样，哪怕细枝末节也是困难无比。庞然大物，一旦坍塌，想再扶起，极其困难；抑或连经历一次剧烈抖动都很难再被扶直。因而，如此之物，一旦坍塌，往往十分可怕。如果国家的法律法规存有缺陷的话（单凭很多国家的法律中都存在差异性这一点就可断定），毫无疑问，习惯法可以极大地消除这些缺陷所带来的弊端，甚至可以完全避免或于不知不觉中改正一些连精明理智都无法完全避免的毛病。简言之，较之根除缺陷所带来的变化而言，人们通常更能容忍这些缺陷本身。犹如山间曲径，走的多了，也就逐渐平坦宽阔了，比之寻找笔直小径，攀登岩石顶峰，下探悬崖谷底要好得多。

因此，那些虽不是靠出身和钱财混入官场，却躁动不安、忙忙碌碌，总是叫嚣着改革的爱管闲事之人，我是极不喜欢的。如果这个小册子里，有任何东西能证明我受过这些愚蠢行径的毒害，那么我想我是断然不会让它出版的。一直以来，我都在想着如何更好地革新自己的思想，以求其能完全建立在我自己的思想基础之上，除此之外，再没想过别的。尽管对自己的工作较为满意，在此呈现给大家一个草稿，但我并非要建议其他人也做类似的尝试。那些天生聪慧、倍受上帝眷顾的人或许有更崇高的构思。但是我非常担心，对很多人来说，眼前所要求的会超过他们能够有把握大胆去效仿的。就拿推翻自己以往的所有信仰来说，单单这一点，就不是人人都应效仿的。世人中大致有两种不宜以此为榜样。其中一种人，自诩高明，实则不然。他们常不能自抑，判断仓促又耐心不足，难以做有序且审慎之思考。此种人，一旦被允许自由怀疑自己之固有观点，放弃人们常走的大道，则永远都无法穿越那条以捷径引领他们前行的旁道，进而迷失自己，彷徨终生；而另一种人则足够理智，且相当谦虚，能认识到在辨别真伪时尚有很多人高于自己，应多多学习。既然如此，那就可以满足于听取他人之意见，而不必自己苦苦寻找自身的原因了。

至于我自己，倘若自始至终只求学于一人，或倘若我不知古圣先贤之思想也是有分歧的，那么毫无疑问，我应是属于第二种人的。然而，早在大学期间，我就意识到，任何想法，不管多么荒诞怪离，多么难以置信，都是由某个哲学家提出过的。在我游历期间，我也认识到，所有与我们意见完全相左之人，并不因此就是野蛮不开化之人。相反，他们中的许多人跟我们一样运用理性，甚至比我们更善用理性。我还注意到，同样一个人，起初具有同样的心灵，即使自幼在法国或德国成长，那么，如果这个人后来和野蛮人生活在一起，所养成的品性就会大相径庭。正如同衣服一样，十年前流行的样式，也许十年后可能再次流行，而我们现在看来就觉得奢华夸张、怪诞可笑。因此我推想，我们固有的观念只是些成规惯例，称不上什么特定的知识。最后，尽管拥有这样的固有观念，我还要指出，多数人赞成的并不能保证就是真理，因为在这种情况下根本就不容易发现真理。此类真理很可能出自个人之发现，而非众人之发现。然而，在茫茫人海中，我竟然挑不出一个人，其观点似乎还值得汲取，由此我发现自己无可奈何，我只好用自己的理性来指导自己的生活了。

然而，如同在黑暗中独行一般，我决心谨小慎微、缓慢前行。如此一来，虽然进步不大，但至少可以谨防摔跤。甚至，有些观点未经理性之引导就慢慢地成为我信念的一部分，但是我并不会大刀阔斧将之摈弃，而是首先花费充足时间仔细考察，为自己所要从事的工作拟出总体计划，确保用正确的方法，以己之力，获得知识。

在哲学的各个分支中，我早年学过一点逻辑学；在数学方面，我也学过解析几何和代数。在我看来，这三门艺术或学问应该对我的计划有所裨益。但经过观察，我发现，逻辑学的三段论和大部分其他法则只是用来说明我们已知的东西。就连吕里的艺术也只是不加判断地说些我们不知道的东西，并没有对未知之事物加以研究。虽然逻辑学确实包含有很多正确而且非常卓越之法则，但其中也混杂着许多有害或者多余的东西，要想辨别真伪，其困难几乎不亚于从一块未经雕琢的大理石中撷取出狄安娜或者密涅瓦的雕像来。至于古代的解析几何和现代的代数，都只是研究一些高度抽象而看起来又毫无用处的东西。此外，前者只限于考察图形，因而只能令人疲于想象之后才有所理解，而后者则完全使人陷于种种定律和方程式中，使人感觉是一种纷乱晦涩、迷惑难解之艺术，而非适合培养心智之科学。出于这些考虑，我才决心另辟蹊径，剔除这三门学问之短，而能积聚三家之长。法令繁多，每每会执行不力，一个国家律法不多却能执法甚严，往往国泰民安。同样，逻辑之学无需大量条规构成。我相信，如果我能下决心坚定不移、从一而终，无论何种情况都能坚决遵循以下四条，对我来说也就足够了。

其一，凡是我未明确弄清楚之物，我决不可信以为真。换言之，我要小心避免轻率之判断和一己之偏见。而且，除了清晰可辨地呈现在我心里，使我根本无法怀疑之物以外，在我的判断里不包容其他任何东西。

其二，将审查的各个难题尽可能细化，从而逐个妥善解决。

其三，依次思考，从最简单的对象和最容易认识的对象开始，按部就班，逐步上升，直至最复杂之对象。甚至将那些本质上无先后次序之物，也在思想中给出特定之顺序。

最后，无论任何情况都要进行全面周到之考察，复查也要周全，确保毫无遗漏。

几何学家常常运用一长串简单容易之推理，即可完成最艰难之证明。由此，我认为，人类所能认识的一切事物皆是用相同的方式相互联系的，只要不把假的当成真的接受，并永远遵守由一个真理推导出另一个真理之必然顺序，如此，则世上无远得不可达到之目标，亦无什么真理隐蔽得我们不能发现。而且，从何入手，对我来说并不很难决定。因为我早已知道，从最简单、最容易的事物着手。考虑到古今多少不同学科领域探索真理的学者当中，唯有数学家掌握了证明之法，即一些确切而有证据的推理，我就毫不迟疑地依循他们调查问题的规则。于是，我决定从考察最简单的对象开始做起。然而，我并不期望由此得到什么好处，只希望心灵得以熏陶，养成热爱真理、摒弃虚妄之论的习惯罢了。但是，我并未因此就打算去研究众人俗称的数学范围内的一切具体学问。据我观察，这些学问虽然研究对象不同，却有一致之处：即全都仅仅研究那些对象之间的各种关系或比例。因此我认为，我的目标最好还是尽可能用最一般的形式来研究这些比例，而不论及任何具体事物，除非是极有用之物，更不要使其受制于某些事物，如此才能将其恰当地应用于其他任何一个对象。为将这些关系弄明白而做进一步深入观察，有时我应该对它们一一研究，有时则只要把它们牢记于心，进行综合分析。因此我想，为便于逐个研究它们，我可以把它们视为线性的关系。我发现，这样的话，研究对象就简单多了，或者更能清晰明确地在我的想象和感官中呈现出来；另一方面，为了能够对它们牢记不忘，或把许多东西放在一起综合研究，我应当尽可能用一些最简短的字符来阐释它们。采用此种方法，我相信，我就可以提取解析几何和代数之精华，并能够取长补短，更正彼此的全部缺点。

实际上，我可以斗胆说，因为我严格遵守了这几条规则，便可以毫不费力地将这两门学问的所有问题弄得清清楚楚。在从事研究的两三个月里，我不但解决了过去难以解决的问题，而且对尚未解决的问题，我也很有把握，能看出可用什么方法解决，以及可能解决到哪个地步。这样的结果归因于我从最简单、最一般的真理着手，所发现的每一条真理都是一条规则，这条规则又可以用来发现其他真理。在这一方面，我并非夸大其词，因为大家可以想想，如果一条真理在任何一个特殊的点上是一条真理，那么无论是谁，理解了这一真理，他就知道了那一点上人们能够知道的一切。比如，一个小孩在学了算术之后，按照规则做完一道加法题，那么人们可以确信，在这道题的数字之和方面，他已经发现了人类才智所能发现的一切。总而言之，因为这种方法教人遵照事物的正当次序，确切地列举事物的所有条件，所以本身就包含了算术规则之所以可靠的全部条件。

不过，这种方法最令我满意之处在于，我确实感到它可以使我很有把握地在各个方面运用我的理性，虽不至于尽善尽美，至少也将我的能力发挥到了极致。此外，我还感到，因为运用这种方法，我的心灵逐渐习惯于把研究对象看得更明确、更清晰了。我并未将这种方法固定在某种对象上，我还希望能用其解决其他学科的难题，如同成功地解决代数难题一样。不过，我并没有因此就贸然去研究我在所有学科中遇到的难题，因为这样本身就可能违反了这种方法规定的规律。但我注意到，这些规律的知识都要依靠从哲学那里借来的原理，而在哲学中我从未发现任何准确的原理，所以我的第一要务是努力建立哲学的原理。另外，因为我观察到，为哲学创建原理一事最为重大，而且最怕轻率判断，也最怕坠入成见之中，所以，我想应该等我到了更为成熟的年纪时（我当时才23岁）才去做这个工作。我应首先用更多的时间为这个工作做准备，一方面要完全抛弃我心里以前所接受的一切错误的观点，另一方面要积累各种不同的经验，以便得到我推理的材料，同时在运用我所选择的方法上不断地训练自己，以求更能纯熟地运用它。

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第三部分

最后，正如我们在着手重建住宅之前，若只是把旧房拆掉、材料备好、建筑师请好，或者我们亲自设计，并仔细绘出图纸，这些是不够的。我们同时必须另外准备一所房子，以便在施工期间住得宽敞些。这样，当我受理性驱使而变得举棋不定时，才不至于在行动上犹疑不决。为了能够以尽可能幸福的方式活着，我制定了一套临时性的道德规范，共有三四条准则，在此我愿介绍给大家，以便周知。

第一，遵守国家的法律，遵从国家的风俗习惯，笃守信仰，因为这信仰乃上帝所赐，我从小就受教于它。在其他任何事情上，以身边贤达为榜样，在实践中依据最恰当的观点，最大可能不走极端来规范自己的行为。因为我希望对自己所有的观点进行审查，所以从那时起，我已经将自己的观点视为虚空无用，但是，我深信在过渡时期，最好是遵从贤达的观点。虽然在波斯，也许有些人与我们这里的人同样贤达，但是为方便起见，我认为效仿自己周围的人似乎更好。而且，对我而言，要想查明这些人真正的观点，我必须观察他们的行动，而不能只听其口说。这不仅仅是因为如今世风日下，很少有人愿意完全吐露自己真实的心声，还因为太多的人并不知道自己真正所信为何物。因为相信一件事和知道一件事本是不同的心理活动，两者不一定时常结伴而行。而且，许多观点在众人那里享有同样声誉，我总是从中选择最恰当的，多是因为这些观点最便于用于实践，而且也许是最好的（所有极端之意见一般都有弊端）。再者，一旦出错，我也许不会偏离真理太远。如果我选择了一个极端，而本该选定另一个极端，那就会犯错误了。我所认为极端者，尤其包括所有限制我们某项自由的种种承诺。我并非反对法律允许以发誓作为约定，以及通过订立约束双方的合同进行约定，其目的是谨防意志不坚之人摇摆不定、反复无常，保证达到某种正当目的，甚至为了商业安全，制订与约定相类似的法令，却对如何实现目标漠不关心；而是因为我发现世间万物都处在变化之中，特别是对我个人而言，我希望自己的判断越来越完善，而不是越来越差。倘若由于我在某个特定时间赞同某事，而在以后的时间里，也许它已不是原来那样了，或者我已停止像原来那样遵从它了，可我还必须在以后的时间里也要说它是好的，我认为那是违背理智的一项重罪。

我的第二条准则是：在行动时尽可能坚定不移，一旦选定某些观点，哪怕它们是最可怀疑的，也要将之当作十分可靠的观点，毫不动摇地遵循。在这一点上，我效仿森林中迷路的旅行者，当其在森林中迷路时，不应当东西乱撞，更不可停留一处，应当尽可能始终朝一个方向直线前进，纵然最开始的时候这个方向是偶然选定的，但是也不要因一些微不足道的理由就改变方向。这样，即使不能准确地达到期望的目的地，至少最终也会到达某个地方，那里可能比森林中央要好。同样，在行动中常常是不许有任何耽搁的。有一点是千真万确的，就是当我们无法辨别真伪时，就应当遵奉最可能的意见来行事。即便无法评判一个意见可能比另一个意见更好，我们也必须选择一个出来，然后在实践中去遵奉它，认定它是最真实可靠的，不再怀疑它。因为决定我们选择的理由本身就具有这些特质。此后，有了这条原则，我足以摆脱所有悔恨和懊恼，不像意志薄弱且摇摆不定之人那样，没有丝毫清晰明确的选择原则，总是随风而动、反复无常，今天选定这个行动为最好的，第二天就认为是最坏的，将其抛弃。

我的第三条准则是：永远努力征服自己，而非征服命运；改变自己的欲望，而非改变世界的秩序。一般而言，我要劝说自己相信，除自己的思想外，我们根本无力支配任何东西。自身以外的事情，尽全力之后却没有完成，那么对我们来说，这是绝对办不成的事情了。单单这一个原则似乎就足以阻止我的奢望，任何得不到的东西，将来也就别想再得手，如此，我也就心满意足了。因为我们所要寻求的，本来就是某种能力范围内之物。显而易见，若将身外之物皆看成是在自己能力之上，那么对于那些生来似乎当有之物，若并非由于我们的过失而导致其缺失，我们也就不会再因此而感到懊恼了，就如同我们不会因为中国或墨西哥的山河不属于我们而懊恼一样。这样一来，我们就把去做非做不可之事假装成出于好心才做。容许我打个譬喻，我们就不必在病中妄想健康，在牢中奢望自由了；犹如我们现在不希求有钻石般不易败坏的躯体，或者有鸟儿那飞翔的翅膀。不过我承认，要使我的心灵习惯于用此种方法认识所有对象则需要长期训练、反复沉思。我相信，古代哲学家能摆脱命运的纠缠，漠视痛苦和贫困，享受快乐，令鬼神羡慕，其秘诀就在于此。因为在他们夜以继日、专心致志地思考过自然给予他们的权限之后，他们相信除自己的思想外，再别无他物可以支配。认清这一点就足以使他们心无挂碍，对其他事物不再抱任何奢望。对自己的思想取得绝对支配后，他们就比其他人更富裕、更强大、更自由、更幸福。因为其他人不懂这个哲学，无论自然和命运怎样眷顾他们，他们也不能支配一切、事事如愿。

最后，为了总结这个道德准则，我曾想到回顾人们一生中不同的职业，以便选择其中最优者。对于别人的职业，我无意给出任何评论，至于我自己，我深信最好是一如既往坚持我的职业，也就是穷尽一生之力，以我已经给自己制定的原则为方法，培养理性，争取最大进步，认识真理。自从应用这种方法以来，我找到了满足的源泉。我快慰人生，相信在一生中没有什么比这种满足更完美、更纯真了。凭借这种方法，我日日都能发现他人一般会忽视的重要真理，因此满心欢喜，对别的事情皆提不起什么兴趣了。此外，上述三条准则之目的只有一个，就是继续自我教育。既然上帝赐给我们每个人一些理性之光，可使我们辨别真理与谬误，我就相信我一时一刻也不该只满足于他人之意见，除非我已下定决心，每当对任务有了相当的准备之后便用我自己的判断来检验他人之意见。当然也不能毫无顾忌地依着他人之意见向前走，我想这样会丧失任何去获取世上可能存在的更好意见的良机。总之，如果我不沿着一条路走下去，就无法抑制住我的欲望，也无法保持心满意足的状态。因为照这条路走下去，我敢肯定，一切知识我都可以获得，我也可以获得我所希望最大量取得的真正的好东西。我们是追求还是回避一样东西，只取决于我们是把它看成是好的还是坏的。有正确的判断，势必有正确的行动。判断越正确，则行动越正确，即可得到一切美德以及我们能力范围之内其他一切真正有价值的东西。倘若我们确定能有这样的收获，那么我们自然会心满意足了。

有了这些准则，并把它们和我对真理的信仰（永远在我心中占首要地位）放在一起，我得出结论，我可以自由地将我所固有的观点统统抛弃。这些思想是我在很长的退役时间里独处时产生的。因为我希望能够成功地完成这个工作，所以与人交流会更好一些。于是，冬天还没结束时，我又开始四处游历了。之后的九年中，我到处游荡，别无他事。在世界大舞台上，我只想做个旁观者，不想参与其中。对每一件事情，特别是非常可疑以及很可能引发错误的事情，我都仔细思考一番。渐渐地，我将从前潜入思想中的错误统统根除了。我并不是效仿那些怀疑论者，他们仅仅怀疑可怀疑之物，为了怀疑而怀疑。相反，我只为找到确切证据，抛弃松散的沙土，以便觅寻到岩石或黏土。在我看来，这样做是非常成功的。因为我努力找出被考察命题的谬误或不确定之处，靠的不是软弱无力的猜测，而是清晰确定的推理。任何命题，不管多么可疑，总能推导出一些足够可靠的结论，哪怕命题本身不包含任何可靠内容，而仅仅是推理。正如拆毁一所旧房屋，我们通常将拆除的旧物留下，以备盖新房之用。同样，我在摧毁一些我判断根基不牢靠之观点时，我就多多观察，取得许多经验，以备我建立更为正确之观点。此外，我继续运用我已制定的方法训练自己。在一般情况下，除了按照其规则督导我的一切思想外，间或也会留些时间，特意用这种方法解决数学难题，甚至一些与其相似的其他学科的难题。但是有些问题所依据的学科原则不够牢靠，在剔除这些原则之后，就跟数学问题差不多了。这个真理会从本书中的大量实例中显现出来。如此，表面看来，我的生活与那些讨人喜欢、头脑简单之徒没有什么差别：他们只想快乐，拒绝邪恶，享受清闲，不知疲倦，认为这些追求是高尚荣耀的。但是，我从未放弃我的计划，而是不断进益、认识真理。这样做，比之仅仅埋头苦读，或者仅仅与文人交往，也许进步要大一些。

然而，九年时间过去了，对于饱学之士争论不休的难题，我依然没有作出任何判断。寻求比庸俗哲学更可靠的哲学原理也尚未着手。过去曾有许多最了不起的天才都尝试过这个计划，但我觉得他们似乎都没有成功，这就令我认识到这是一项非常艰巨的工作。要不是现在听到有谣言说我已经完成了这项工作，我也许还不会贸然这么快就着手干呢。谣言之根据何在，我尚不知道。若是与我的言论有关，定是因为我比那些按习惯办事、有点儿学问之人更勇于承认自己的无知，也可能是因为我给出了种种理由来质疑许多被其他人判断为千真万确的事情，而不是因为我吹嘘哲学的某种学说。但是，天性使然，我不愿被人评价为有名无实。我想我必须尽己所能，不负众望。整整八年，这种愿望使我决意避开任何可能遇到熟人的场合，于是来到这个国度。这里，连年战火之后，现已秩序井然，驻军也仅用于保障居民安享和平；这里人口众多，大家积极肯干，忙于商业，更关心自己之业务，不太过问他人之事。居于这些人中间，我既能享受最繁华大城市的各种便利，又能一人独处、远离尘寰，如同置身于最荒芜的沙漠深处。

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第四部分

在上述方面对事情最初的一些想法，我不知道是否应该跟大家谈谈，因为那些想法过于玄妙，并不常见，也许未必人人都能接受。但是，为使大家能够评判我所建立的根基是否足够坚实，我觉得必须要谈一下。很久以前我就发现，正像前面说过的，在实践过程中，有时需要采纳一些我们明知非常不可靠的观点，就好像它们是铁定无疑的。然而，因为那时我的目的是唯求真理，所以我想我需要一种完全相反的做法：凡我认为有丝毫可疑之处，我皆应视为绝对谬误，不予采纳，以便查实此后我的信念中是否会留有完全不容置疑之物。如此，既然感官有时欺骗我们，我就认定，任何东西其实质和其呈现给我们的都是不一样的。再者，因为有些人推理时出错，会作出似是而非的推理，就连最简单的几何问题也会这样，我相信，我跟别人一样难免不犯错误，所以我就把曾经用于证明的理由皆认为是假的，统统予以抛弃。最后，我想到清醒时的思想（图像）在睡梦中也会完全相同地袭上心头，而梦中之物皆不是真的，于是我假设在我清醒时进入我心中的所有事物（图像）必同梦中幻影一样，都是不真实的。但我很快注意到，既然我有意将一切视为虚假，那么执此思想之我绝对应该是某种真实存在的。由于我认为“我思故我在”（COGITO ERGO SUM）这一真理十分可靠且显而易见，怀疑主义者不管多猖狂都不能将之动摇，所以我断定我可以毫不犹豫地接受它，视它为我所寻求的哲学之第一条原则。

然后，我谨慎地研究我是什么。我发现，我可以假设我没有肉体，也可以假设世界不存在，我立足的地方也不存在，但却无法假设我之不存在。相反，正因为我有意怀疑其他事物之真实性，因而更明显而确切地证明了我之存在。另一方面，如果我只是停止思想，即令我过去想象的一切其他事物都真实存在，我却没有理由相信自己之存在。所以我总结出，我是一个实体，其全部本性或本质仅是以思考之形式而存在，而且，其存在无需空间，亦无需依赖于任何物质的东西。因此，此“思想之我”，即我之所以为我的心灵之我，与肉体之我是完全不同的，甚至更易为人认识。即使肉体之我不存在，心灵之我仍然不停止它本来的一切。

紧接着，我就做了总体上的考察，看看一个命题之真实性和确切性的基本条件是什么。既然我已发现了一个命题，知道它是真实的，我想同样我应该能够弄清楚它何以真实。我注意到，在“我思故我在”这一命题中，根本没有什么东西可以给我保证它们的真实性。除此之外，我明显地看出，只有存在才能思考。因此我得出结论，我可以以此原则作为一个总的规则：凡能为我们所非常清晰、非常明确地认识到的事物都是真实存在的。不过，我也注意到，要正确地判断什么是我们能清楚认识的东西，还是有些困难的。

此后，我对我怀疑的情形进行了反省，结果发现，我之存在并不是十分完美的（因为我清楚地认识到，知道比怀疑更为完美），这引导我去研究世上有比我自己更完美之物这一想法是从何而来的。而且我清楚地认识到，我必须持此理念，因为它源自于比现实中更为完美的某些本性。至于对许许多多身外之物—诸如天、地、光、热等等世间万物—的思考，要想知其根源，我是不用费很大力气的。因为既然从这些事物中看不出有任何似乎优于我的地方，我就可以相信，若它们是真实的，那么它们是隶属于我之本性的，这样我之本性才趋于某种特定的完美。若它们是错误的，那么它们就是我凭空捏造的。换言之，它们之所以在我心中存在，乃是由于我之本性还不完美。但是，在想到比我自己更完美的本质观点时，情形就不同了，因为凭空捏造它明显是不可能的。如果说更完美者来源于不完美者，并且依赖于它，这实在是令人反感，不亚于无中生有的说法。同样，我是不可能自己捏造这个本质观点的。因此剩下的便是，这个本质观点能置于我心实是因为现实中有比我更完美之本质，其本身具有我能想出的任何观点所需要的一切完美的东西。简言之，那就是上帝。在此，我还要补充一点，既然我知道在一些方面自己并不完美，我就不会是世间唯一之存在（请原谅我在此自由地使用经院名词），但是相反，世间必定有比我更完美之存在为我所依赖，而且我所拥有的一切也由它而获得。若世间只有我存在，并且不依赖于任何其他事物，则我现在已有的所有完美，不管多么微小，皆我实际所拥有。同理，我应该能够从我自身得到余下的全部完美属性，我意识到这是我所欠缺的。如此一来，我自然而然就能够变得无穷无尽、永恒不变、万古不移、无所不知、无所不能。总而言之，凡我能够从上帝那里识解的所有完美，我都能拥有。尽我自己最大之力去了解上帝之本质(其存在已由前述之推理得到确认），我只需参照我在心灵中发现的一些观念的所有特质，看其属性是否达于完美。我坚信，凡完美之物，上帝尽皆有之；凡缺憾之物，在上帝身上踪迹皆无。这样，我就明白了，迟疑不定、反复无常、哀愁苦怨等等诸如此类之事，在上帝那里是找不到的，因为我自己都以能摆脱这样的事为欢娱。除此之外，我还有许多有关可感知之物和有形之物的观念。因为，虽然我可以假定梦中之物以及我之全部所见、所想皆为假象，然而，我却不能否认，这些观念确确实实存在于我的思想之中。不过，因为我自己已非常清楚地认识到，人之悟性本质与形体本质截然不同；同时我也观察到，所有组合乃彼此依赖之证据，而彼此依赖之状态明显是一种不完美状态，所以，我断定这两种本质之结合绝非上帝之完美所在，而且上帝也绝非两者之结合。若世上有任何完全不完美的实体，甚至智力或者其他本质，那么，它们之存在则完全依赖于上帝之力量，且须臾也离不开他。

我打算径直去寻求其他真理。我自己一直以几何学家的研究对象为例，我将其视为一个连续不断的实体或者一个空间，其长、宽、高或深延伸得无边无际，亦可分为种种不同部分，其大小不一、形状各异，并且可以随意移动或更换位置（因为这一切皆为几何学家假定的研究对象应有的特质），为此我研究了其中几个最简单的证明。首先，我注意到，众人公认的这些证明之所以十分正确，是因为它们只是基于我已列出的规则，它们才被世人完全理解。其次，我发现，在这些证明中根本没有迹象表明其对象之存在。试举例，假设有一个三角形，我明确地领会到，其三个内角之和必定等于两个直角之和，但是，仅仅依此领会并不能使我完全相信三角形之存在。相反，当我回头审查完美存在的观点时，我发现那个完美存在已经包含在那个观点中了，正如三角形的观念中包含了三个内角等于两个直角，或者正如球形的观念中包含了球面任何一点与球心之距离相等，或者甚至更明晰。由此可见，至善至美的上帝之有或存在这一命题至少同几何学中的任何命题一样可靠。

但是，很多人觉得，要认识这条真理是件困难的事情，甚至认识自己的心灵真正为何物也是很困难的。原因在于，他们的思想常囿于感官能及之物，并且他们非常习惯于用想象的方法观察事物，而想象是一种仅限于对实在物质的思维方式。这样，对他们而言，凡不可想象之物似乎就变得难以理解了。这一真理在单一情况下是非常明显的—经院哲学家们把它当成一条格言信奉，他们认为，凡理性之物必先存在于感官中。然而，可以肯定的是，上帝之观念和灵魂之观念从来不在感官之中。我以为，经院哲学家们靠他们的想象来理解这些观念，恰恰好比他们努力用眼睛来闻声嗅味，只是事实上还有这样一种区别—视觉比嗅觉和听觉更能使我们感觉可靠罢了。若无理智之介入，无论是我们的想象还是我们的感官，都不能使我们确切相信任何东西。

最后，在我给出种种理由之后，可能仍然还有人对上帝和灵魂之存在不很信服，那么我真切地请他们想想其他所有的假设，想想那些他们也许更能相信的真实的东西，比如人有身体，世间有星星和地球存在，诸如此类，其实它们并不很确切。因为，尽管我们对这些东西不但相信，而且对它们的存在坚信不疑——除非谁智力有缺陷，否则没有人能够否定这些事物的存在，可是，问题一旦涉及到形而上学之真切性时，就没有充足的理由来保证完全的可靠性了。试想在梦中，我们不也能想象我们自己有另外一个身体，看见不同的星星和另外一个地球，而实际上，什么东西也没有。那么，我们怎样才能知道，梦中的思想不如清醒时的思想真实呢？况且前者之生动惟肖、清晰易辨常常不亚于后者。纵使最高明的天才，以他们最喜爱的方式研究这个问题，除非他们假定上帝之存在，否则我都不相信他们能找出足够的理由来消除这个疑团。因为首先，连我之前当作规则提出的原则—“凡能为我们所清晰明确地认识到的事物都是真实存在的。”—之所以可靠，也只是因为上帝是有的或存在的，而且，上帝是至善至美的。因为我们所有的一切皆来自于上帝：我们的观念或看法来自于上帝，它们是真实的，其清晰可见、明确可辨也是真实的，是来自于上帝的，这样它们一定是真实的。所以，尽管我们常常有一些观点或理念含有错误成分，但那只是在某些混乱不清、隐晦难辨的情况下才有的，并且这种情况来自于虚无（否定的参与）。换言之，其之所以能这样混乱模糊地存在于我们心中，是因为我们自己不够完美。很明显，说谬误或缺陷之所以是缺陷应该归因于它来自上帝，其荒谬程度不亚于说真理或完美应该来自于虚无。但是，如果我们不知道我们所拥有的一切真实和真理皆来自至善至美、无所不能的上帝，那么，无论我们的观点多么清晰、多么明确，我们也应该没有任何理由确信其拥有真实的完美。

但是，在认识了上帝和灵魂，并确定这条规则之后，我们就不难明白，哪怕是在最轻微的程度上，梦中之幻觉也绝对不应该使我们怀疑清醒时思想的真实性。因为即使在梦中，一个人也可能会有一些非常清晰的想法，就如几何学家发现一些新的证明，他的酣睡亦不能阻止这些证明的真实性。至于我们梦境中最常犯的错误，也常存在于我们的外感官以相同的方式给我们表现各种客体的过程中。这样并无坏处，因为这样可以促使我们非常恰当地怀疑由感官得来的观念的真实性。因为，我们在醒时也常被这类相同的方法所欺骗，比如黄疸病人看任何东西都是黄的，再比如星星或天体离我们很远，我们就会觉得它们比实际的小很多。总而言之，无论是在梦中或是清醒，除非有理性为证，否则我们绝不应该允许我们自己轻信任何事物的真实性。还需要注意的是，我说的是我们的理性，而不是我们的想象或感官。例如，虽然我们能非常清楚地看见太阳，我们却不能就此断定它就仅仅只有我们看见的那样小。我们可以非常明确地想象狮头长在山羊身上，却不能就此得出结论说世上有这样的怪物存在。因为理性并没有任何指示，说看到的或想象的就是存在的真相。但是，它却明白无误地告知我们，我们的一切观念或理念都包含一些真理，否则，至善至美、真实真诚之上帝是不会将它们置于我们的头脑之中的。尽管有时候，梦中之想象或许跟清醒时的一样，甚至更为活泼、鲜明，但是梦中之推理却不然，绝对不如清醒时那么清楚、完备。于是理性进一步指示我们，既然我们所有的思想不可能都真实，因为我们不完美，那么那些思想中拥有的真理必定不能从梦中寻得，只能在清醒时的真实体验中获取。

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第五部分

由上述根本原理推衍出的一系列真理，我本想在此一一展示。可是要想这样，就有必要先谈谈众多学者还在争论的许多问题。我不想跟他们发生纠葛，所以，我相信还是不要一一叙述更好些，我只从大体上来说说这些真理。至于详细叙述对大众的好处，就由高明人士来判断吧。最初之决心，我现在仍然毫不动摇地坚持——除了之前为证明上帝和灵魂的存在所定之原则，不再假定其他原则；任何看法，只要没有几何学家以前的证明更清晰、更明白，我也就不当作真的来接受。这样，我敢大胆地说，我不但在短时间内找到了令我满意的方法来解决在哲学中通常遇到的种种重要难题，而且还发现上帝用这样的方法在自然界中确立的特定规律，并将这样的概念铭刻在我们的心上。我们在对这些理念充分反省之后，就会毫无疑义地相信，世上存在的万物或发生的万事无不严格遵守这些规律。进一步观察过后，我发现这些规律一气呵成、吻合无间，因此我认为，我发现了许多真理，这些真理与我从前学到的，甚至期盼学到的一切真理相比都更为有用、更为重要。

我曾写过一篇专题论文，尝试阐述这些发现的主要部分，不过基于种种顾虑，没有出版。因此我想，如果在此将其内容略加说明，使人知晓，那真是再方便不过了。在动笔之前，本想将我所知道的有关有形客体的本质东西统统包括进去，不过，正如画家一样，要想在一个平面上把一个立体的不同面都表现出来是不可能的，他们只能选择主要的一面朝向光线，其他方面则处于阴面，以便在作画时能看到主要一面，也能最大限度地看到其他各面。同样，我也怕论述中不能包括我头脑中的全部内容，所以我决定只单独阐述对光的理解，尽管这样，篇幅依然很长；然后借机附带谈了谈有关太阳和恒星的一些内容，因为光几乎全部来自于它们；再谈谈天空，因为天空传播光；又谈到行星、彗星和地球，因为它们反射光；还特别谈到了地球上的各种生物，因为它们有的带颜色，有的透明，有的能发光；最后谈到了人，因为人是这一切对象的观察者。为了能把这些物质的多样形态更多地置于阴面，也为了便于我能有更大自由判断它们，无需对学者之意见表示赞成或反对，我决定任凭大家辩论，我只是想说新世界会发生的事。试想上帝现在在某个想象的空间里创造足够的物质来建立一个新世界，把这些物质各个部分都搅得形态各异、复杂纷乱，这样就会出现一个混沌状态，杂乱无序，如同诗人曾经捏造的那样。此后，除提供一些寻常的协力外，上帝不再赐予自然丝毫力量，而是让其按照上帝已建立的规则自行发展，看看这样会发生什么。基于这个假设，我首先就描述了这些物质，并试图用这种方式阐明，在我看来，除之前所说之上帝和灵魂外，其他一切都不如物质的本性那样清晰明了、易于理解。因为，我甚至假设，这些物质并没有经院哲学家们常常辩论的那些形式或性质，一切都是我们心灵所熟知的，谁都不能装作不知道。此外，我还对何为自然法则加以说明。我并不依靠别的原理，只根据上帝之无限完美进行推理，力求对一切可疑之规律作出证明，并力求证明其确为自然规律。而且，即便在上帝创造的其他世界里，也无一不遵守这些规律。接着，我又指出，这混沌中的大部分物质必然按照这些规律，以一定方式自行排布，形成天空之象。与此同时，其中有的部分必然形成地球、行星和彗星，其他的则形成太阳和恒星。说到这里，我转而谈论光这个主题。我以相当大的篇幅说明，光之本质为何必定存在于太阳和星星上，以及它是如何在瞬间穿过浩瀚长空，从行星和彗星反射到地球的。同样，对诸天体和星星的实质、位置、运动，以及这些天体和星星的所有不同性质，我又做了许多补充。我想这样一来，我所说的足以告诉大家，我们这个世界的天体和星球跟我所描述的那个世界应该没有丝毫差别，或者至少可以清晰地显得没有丝毫差别。接下来，我又特别说到了地球，并展示给大家，虽然我已明确假设上帝并未给组成地球的物质任何重量，但是仍不妨碍地球各部分精确地向地心集中。既然地表有水，有空气，那么天空和天体的构造，尤其是月球的构造如何一定会引起潮汐，而且在各方面都跟我们在海洋里见到的一样，还引起一种从东到西的洋流和气流，同我们在热带地区见到的也是一样，何以山脉、海洋、泉水、河流能在地球上自然形成，矿石如何能在矿区产出，植物如何能够在田野里生长，各种常见的所谓混合物或组合物如何能够产生。之前所述的新东西中，除了星星之外，我知道只有火能发光，因此我不辞辛苦，详详细细地说明与火有关之事——指出火是怎么产生的，又是怎么维持的，为何时而有热无光，时而有光无热；火如何能在不同物体上产生不同颜色和不同的属性；火如何能够熔化某些物体，又能够将另一些物体烧硬；火如何能够烧毁几乎所有的东西，将其烧成灰和烟；最后，如何根据灰的密度再将它们烧制成玻璃。因为，在我看来，这一过程跟自然界其他各种转化一样奇妙，所以，我描述起它来别有一番乐趣。尽管如此，我不想就此得出结论，说这个世界就是照我所描述的方式创造的，因为很有可能上帝最初是瞬间就把它创造完成了。不过，可以肯定，神学家也一致公认，上帝现在维持世界之行动，正如最初他创造世界之行动。因此，纵然上帝最初给予世界的只是一个混沌状态，不过只要他确立了特定的自然规律，并给世界以协助，使其能照常活动，我们仍可相信，单单照此途径，一切纯物质的东西，经过一段时间，都能逐渐变成现在我们所见之情形。这与创世之奇迹并不冲突。而且，将其看成以这种方式逐渐形成，比之只将它们看成一次成形便呈现完结、完美之状态，更容易了解其本质。

在描述了无生命之物体和植物之后，我进而论及动物，尤其是人类。可是，因为我这方面的知识还不够，不能以之前的那种方式来应对这类事物，也就是说，不能用原因来推断结果，说不明白自然是从什么元素中把他们产生出来的，以什么方式产生的。所以，我姑且假设，上帝所造之人，不论是外形还是内部器官之构造，跟我们每个人都是一样的。造人所用之物质，也同我所描述的一样，而且一开始这人并无理性之灵魂，也无任何别的原则可用来代替植物性的或感觉性的灵魂，只不过在他心里点了一把正如上面所说的无光之火。我以为，此火之本质无异于使湿草堆发热之火，或者使水果汁发酵变成新酒所需之火。正因为基于这个假设，我仔细考察了人的身体可能拥有的功能，我清晰地发现，所有那些我们可以拥有的功能恰恰可以不依靠我们所有的思维能力，并且丝毫不假借于灵魂。换言之，那些功能不必假借我们身体的哪一部分。如前所述，本质以特别的方式包含在思维之中，这完全可以说，无理性之动物的功能跟我们是一样的，只是我从中找不到人类的那种只依靠思想的功能，那种只属于我们人类的功能。另一方面，只有当我假设上帝创造了一个理性的灵魂，并按我所描述的特殊方法将灵魂加装到那个身体上之后，我才能真正发现这些功能。

但是，为了向大家展示我在那篇文章里是怎样处理这类问题的，我打算在此说明一下心脏和动脉的运动，因为这是人们观察到的动物最基本、最普遍的运动，这将给人们提供一种方法，可以很容易地确定应该怎样看待其余器官的运动。为了使大家能比较容易地明白我对这个问题接下来要进行的讨论，我建议请那些不熟悉解剖学的人费点力气，在阅读这些观察说明之前，先找一个有肺的大动物解剖开来，取出心脏摆在面前（因为它的各部分跟人都很相像），看看其中的那两个心室或心房。先看右心房，有两条粗血管与之连接：一条是空腔静脉（腔静脉），是主要的储血器，好像树干一样，体内其他静脉都是其分支；一条是肺静脉（动静脉），这个名字其实不太合适，因为它其实只是一根动脉，以心脏为出发点，经过心脏后，分为许多分支，布满两肺。再看左心房，也同样连接着两条大血管，大小跟右心房的相同或稍大一点。一条是肺动脉（静动脉），这个名字也不太合适，因为它其实只是一条静脉，来自两肺，也有很多分支，同肺静脉的分支相互交织。那些分支叫做气管，我们就是通过气管吸进空气的。另一条是大动脉，由心脏出发，分支遍布全身。我还希望这些人能仔细观察一下那十一片瓣膜，它们像十一道小的阀门一样，启闭两个心房的四条血管。三片在大静脉口，不妨碍血液流入心脏的右心房，然而又刚好阻止血液从心脏流出；三片在肺静脉口，其排布与前者恰恰相反，只允许右心房里的血液流入肺中，但是阻止肺中的血液回流进这个心房；另有两片在肺动脉口，能以同样的方式使血液从肺流入心脏的左心房，并能阻止血液回流；还有三片位于大动脉口，能使血液流出，但能阻止血液回流。瓣膜为什么会是十一个，除了肺动脉位置的本质特点外，我们无需寻找别的理由，其口是椭圆的，两片瓣膜足以使其闭拢，而其他三条都是圆形的，需要三片瓣膜才能更方便地将其闭拢。此外，我还要请这些人注意，大动脉和肺静脉的组织结构比大静脉和脉动脉要坚硬得多，结实得多。大静脉和脉动脉在进入心脏前，扩大成两个囊形物，称为心耳，跟心脏本身一样是由肌肉构成的。心脏的温度总高于身体的其他部分。最终，这种热度能够使流入心房的血滴迅速扩张、膨胀，正如同将各种液体一滴滴地滴入高温容器中所展示的那样。

明白了这些以后，对于心脏的运动，我就不用再费周折解释了。当两心房没有充满血液时，血液必然就会从大静脉流入右心房，从肺动脉流入左心房，因为这两条血管是一直充满血液的。其开口又是向着心房，所以是不能关闭的。可是，一旦有两滴血液通过，一滴进入一个心房，因为通过两滴血液的进口很大，后面的血管又充满血液，两滴血液必然非常大，所以遇到高温会立刻变得稀薄，并且膨胀开来。这样一来，就导致整个心脏开始膨胀，同时将两条血管入口处的五片小瓣膜推至闭拢，这样就堵死了进入心脏的任何血液。这两滴血变得越来越稀薄，继而把另外两条血管切口上的六片瓣膜推开，血液会流出去，这样导致肺静脉和大动脉的所有分支血管就会跟心脏几乎一起扩张起来。随后，因为进入这些血管的血液冷却，心脏和动脉会立刻开始收缩，六片瓣膜就关闭起来，大静脉和肺动脉的五片瓣膜便会重新打开，又会允许两滴血液流进来，而使心脏和动脉再次像前面叙述的那样膨胀。由于流入心脏的血液先经过了两个称为心耳的囊，所以心耳的运动跟心脏的运动是刚好相反的。心脏舒张时心耳则收缩。由于一些人不了解数学论证的力量，不习惯于辨别真正的推理和似是而非的推理，所以很可能不加考察就否定我上述的说法。我愿意提醒他们，我刚才解释的心脏运动是器官结构必然引起的，是只有用眼睛才可以观察到的，其热量是可以用手指感觉到的，是可以根据经验从血液的本质了解到的，正如时钟的运动是由其钟摆和齿轮的力量、位置及形状引起的一样。

不过，如果有人要问，既然静脉中的血液不停地流入心脏，心脏中的血液又不停地注入动脉，为什么静脉中的血液不会枯竭，而动脉中的血液又不会太满呢？对于这个问题，我只需引用一位英国医生的解释就能予以答复。他有幸在这方面有破天荒的论述，首次指出：动脉末梢有许多细小的通道，因为有这些通道，从心脏流出的血液就能进入静脉的微小分支，重新流回心脏。这样，它的行程就是一个精确而且永不停息的循环。关于这个说法，我们在外科医生的日常经验中可以找到大量证据。外科医生切开手臂静脉时，如果在切口上方用绑带把手臂不松不紧地捆住，这样的出血量比之不捆要多。如果捆在切口下方，也就是捆在手和切口之间，或是在上方捆得太紧，情况就会完全相反。原因很明显，在上方不松不紧地捆住可以阻止手臂里已有的血液通过静脉流回心脏，但并不会因此妨碍新的血液通过动脉不断地从心脏流出。因为这些动脉位于静脉下面，血管壁比较坚韧，不易挤压，而且，从心脏流出、通过动脉流到手的血，其力量要比从手通过静脉流回心脏的血量大。从手通过静脉流回心脏的血液既然由一根静脉上的切口从手臂里流出，那么必定有一些通道位于捆扎处下方，也就是说，在靠近手臂的末端，血液可以从动脉通过那些通道流到切口处。这个医生还对他研究的血液流动做了非常充分的说明。他提出，沿着静脉有某些细小的皮膜装配在不同的地方，像小瓣膜那样使静脉中的血不能从身体中枢流向末端，而只能从末端流回心脏。此外，还有实验表明，只要切开一根动脉，体内的全部血液会在很短的时间内流光，即使这根动脉是在心脏很近处紧扎且切口在心脏和绷带之间，所以也不难设想，这些血液只能是从心脏中流出的，不可能来自别处。

不过，还有许多其他情况可以证明我所说的话确实是血液运动的真正原因。首先，我们可以观察到，静脉血和动脉血是有差别的，这只能是因为血液在经过心脏时变得稀薄了，被汽化了。所以血液刚刚从心脏流出，也就是刚刚流入动脉时，比血液进入心脏以前，即处在静脉中时要更稀薄、更活泼、更温热。如果仔细观察还可以发现，这种差别只是在靠近心脏的地方表现得非常显著，在离心脏较远的地方则没那么显著了。其次，可以看到，肺静脉和大动脉的血管壁较为坚韧，这足以表明，血液对其冲击比对静脉的冲击更为有力。若不是肺动脉中的血液从心脏流出后，只经过了肺，而变得比大静脉里的血液更精细，更容易变得稀薄，并且在更高的温度下，与刚刚从空的静脉中流出的血液相比，也会发生这样的变化，那么，左心房和大动脉为什么会比右心房和动静脉更宽、更大呢？医生若是不知道，随着血液性质的改变，心脏温度可以使血液的黏稠度变得更高或更低，变化速度也会或快或慢，他又怎么能切脉诊断呢？若要问这种热量是如何传遍全身的，我们只能够说，那是因为血液经过心脏时重新变热，所以可以传遍全身。所以，不管是身体的哪一部分，若是把血液去除，热度也同样会被去除。虽然心脏烫得跟烧红的铁块一样，如果没有把新的血液不断地送进手和脚，那手和脚是不会有温度的。我们从这一点可以看出，呼吸的真正作用就是要往肺里运送足够的新鲜空气。血液在心脏中已经稀化，变成蒸汽，从右心房进入两肺，遇到空气就变得黏稠，重新转化成血液，然后流回左心房。唯有这样才能给心脏中的火提供燃料，这一点可以从各方面得以确认。我们可以看到，没有肺的动物，其心脏也是有心房的，但只有一个心房；腹中之胎儿不能用肺，它们腹中就有一个孔，血液可以从大静脉流到左心房，又有一个管可以使血液从肺静脉一直流到大动脉，而不用经过肺。其次，消化之所以能在胃中进行，是因为心脏通过动脉把热量传送到了胃里，同时还送去了一些流动性更强的血液，帮助分解吃进的食物。如果能想到，血液反复经过心脏，化为蒸汽，一天之内也许超过一两百次，那么不也就很容易理解食物浆汁转化成血液的过程了吗？也没有更多必要解释营养是怎么回事，体内各种体液的产生是怎么回事。只需要说，血液在稀化时带有一股力量，从心脏流向动脉末端，到达各个器官时，血液中某些成分会在那里停留下来，驱逐一些原有成分，占据它们的位置。由于遇到的空隙在位置、形状、大小等方面各有不同，所以有的成分能驻留在一些空隙里，有的则无法驻留。这难道不像一些筛子吗？这些筛子被打上各式各样的漏孔，可以将不同种类的谷物筛选开来。最后，最值得注意的就是动物元气的产生。元气好比一阵非常微妙的风，更像是一团无比纯净且活跃的火焰，持续不断地、大量地从心脏向大脑上升，继而大脑通过神经渗透到肌肉，使全身所有部分能够运动。如此就无需再假设别的原因来解释为什么最活跃、最具渗透力的血液成分最适宜构成元气，为什么它们只流向大脑，而不是别处。这只是因为，从心脏输送到大脑的动脉是最直的，而且，按照机械力学定律（自然规律也是如此），若许多物质全都同时挤向一个点，而这个点又没有足够空间容纳所有物质（血液成分从左心房流到大脑的情况正是如此），那么较弱的和不活跃的物质就一定会被强有力地挤到一边，强有力的物质会以这种方式独自到达那个点。在原来打算出版的那篇专题论文里，我已经把上述一切解释得十分详细了。随后，我又指出，人身上的神经和肌肉一定要如何组织体内的元气才能使身体运动。正如我们看到的那样，刚被砍下的头颅，尽管已经不再是活的了，但仍然还能滚来滚去，甚至啃咬泥土。大脑里一定发生了什么变化才能使人清醒、睡去和做梦；光亮、声音、气味、味觉、温度以及外界事物的所有其他属性怎样能够通过感官在脑海之中留下不同的观念；饥、渴以及其他内心的多种多样的感觉又是怎样在脑海中产生的呢？这些必须要用一般常理（共通感）来解释怎样接纳这些观念，记忆怎样保存这些观念，幻想怎样用不同的方法改变这些观念，进而组成新的观念，并且用同样的方法将动物元气分发到肌肉中，如此方能使身体各部分用不同的方法运动，动作各式各样，合适相宜，既有关于感官对象方面的，又有关于内心感受方面的，正如我们的身体，没有意志导引也能运动。这对一些人来说，一点儿也不奇怪。这些人熟悉各式各样、千差万别的人类编造出来的自动机或者运动机产生的运动。但是，这些机器用的只是几个零部件，这些零部件与每个动物身上大量的骨骼、肌肉、神经、动脉、静脉以及其他部件相比是少之又少的。因此这些人觉得人体也不过是上帝之手造出的机器。不过，比起任何人类发明的机器，人体组织更精致，运动更灵活罢了。说到这里，我特意停下来，我要指出，假如确实有这样的机器，其外形和器官跟猴子或其他无理性动物一样，那么我们根本无法知道，其本性与这些动物有什么区别。可是如果一些机器拥有我们身体的外形，并能尽可能正常地模仿我们的行为举止，我们仍然有两种非常可靠的检验标准来判断其并不因此就是真正的人。第一条标准是：它们永远不会像我们这样使用语言或其他由语言的形态构成的符号向别人表达自己的思想。因为，我们纵然可以容易地想象出这样一台机器，可以发声，甚至有外力碰触改变其部件时，可以有一些相应的回应。例如，如果被触碰某一个特殊地方，它就会问我们要它干什么，如果你触碰另外的地方，它就会喊疼，诸如此类。但是，它绝不能将这些字句进行适当地、多样地排列来回复相应的问题，而这是最笨的人都能办到的。第二条标准是：那些机器虽然可以做许多事情，做得跟我们中的任何人一样好，也许更好，但是，毋庸置疑，仍有一些事情是它们做不了的。由此可以看出，它们的活动所依靠的不是知识，而只是零部件的排列。因为理性是万能工具，适用于各种场合。相反，这些零部件则不然，一举一动都需要有特殊的安排。要想有一台机器，其零部件复杂多样，足以使它模仿人类生活中的一切情景，并能像我们一样依循理性行事，这样的机器肯定是不可能存在的。而且，靠这两条标准，我们同样可以了解人与兽类之间的差别。因为特别值得提出的是，世人无论多么愚昧、多么鲁钝，甚至天生拙笨，总能把不同的字词组织成话语来表达自己的思想。而与此相反，其他的动物不管多么完美，多么得天独厚，都做不到这一点。这一切并不是缺少器官所致，因为我们观察到，八哥和鹦鹉都能像我们人类一样发声，然而却不能像我们人类一样说话。也就是说，不能证明它们理解它们所发出的声音。说到人类，天生聋哑的人跟兽类一样缺少说话所用的发声器官，但是他们却习惯于自发地创造特定的手势，用这些手势向与他们经常在一起并且有空闲时间学习他们“语言”的人们来表达他们的思想。这就证明，兽类并非理性比人少，而是根本没有理性，因为我们明白，一个人学说话并不需要太多理性。我们可以看到，同种的动物，跟人一样，相互间能力不一致，一些比另一些更容易训练。可是，最完美的猴子和鹦鹉，在学说话这一点上，都比不上最笨的小孩，就连精神失常的小孩也比不上。所以简直无法想象，兽类的灵魂在本质上会跟我们的灵魂完全一样。我们不能把语言同动物表达感情的自然动作混为一谈，因为这些动作机器可以模仿，动物也可以模仿。我们也不能像某些古人那样，认为兽类也有语言，只是我们不懂它们的语言罢了。如果真是如此，既然它们有许多跟我们相似的器官，那么它们就应该可以容易地向我们表达它们的思想，就像它们同类之间的交流一样。还有一点非常值得注意的是，虽然许多动物在某些动作上表现得比我们灵巧，然而我们可以看到，它们在其他许多事情上却一点儿也不灵巧。它们做得比我们好并不证明它们就用心灵努力做事，因为，如果它们比我们中的任何人拥有更多的理性，它们会在一切事情上都比我们做得好。这一点反而证明它们并没有理性，它们的一切动作都是身体器官结构的自然反应而已。这正如我们看到的时钟一样，它只有齿轮和发条，却能打点计时，比我们任何人都要精准。

此后，我又把理性灵魂加以描述，指出它绝对不可能跟我说过的其他事情一样也来自于物质的力量。但是，它显然应该是上帝创造出来的。理性灵魂之于身体，并不仅仅是舵手之于船舶那样的关系，否则也许身体的各种器官是不会动的。它必须和身体紧密地合二为一，才能有与我们相似的感觉和嗜好，构成一个真正的人。在结论中，我对灵魂问题稍微多作一些讨论，因为这个问题最重要。无神论者的错误，我在上面已经充分地予以了驳斥。可是，此外还有一种错误最能使不坚定的人离开道德正道，那就是假设兽类的灵魂同我们的灵魂本质相同，因而以为我们跟苍蝇、蚂蚁一样，对身后事既无希望亦无恐惧。相反，如果我们知道，我们与动物的差别有多大，我们就会更好地理解为何我们的灵魂本性可以完全独立于身体之外，因而不会与身体同归于尽了。最后，既然看不到别的原因可以毁灭灵魂，我们自然可以断定，灵魂是不朽的。

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第六部分

那篇专题论文包含了所有这些问题，从完成到现在已经有三年之久了。正当我要着手修改、准备付印时，却听说一些我非常尊重的权威人士抨击了某人新近发表的一种物理学方面的见解。这些权威人士的权威对我行为的影响很大，不亚于我的理性对我思想的影响。某人的那种见解，虽说我不一定坚持，但在他们提出批评之前，我确实没能想到该见解有什么不利于宗教和国家的。因此，倘若我的理性能够证明其真实性，我是不会拒绝把它写进我的书里的。此事不免使我惶恐，因为虽然我一向谨慎小心，但我自己的见解也同某人的见解一样难免会有偏离真理的地方。任何新的见解，只要我没有最可靠之证明，则不予置信。任何见解，只要有可能对他人不利，我总不肯下笔。这足以使我改变原来的决定，不再发表我的那些见解了。因为之前我想发表的理由虽然非常有力，但是依我本就不乐于写书的性格，我立即找到了不少理由，为不付印此书辩解。这些理由，无论从哪方面说都颇有一些意味。因此，不光是我自己有兴趣在这里说一说，而且或许公众也有兴趣想了解一下。

我自己脑中所产之物，我向来不是很看重。靠这种方法，我只是彻底弄明白了一些思辨科学的难题，或者按其教给我的原则，努力规范自己的行为，此外再无所获，因此我从来没有想过一定要出版有关这种方法的某些东西。说到为人处世，人人都是智慧满满，若能自我完善，则个个都是改革能手。那些上帝所赐的万民最高统治者，或者得天独厚、满腔热忱的先知先觉者除外。因此，我的思想，虽然使我自已觉得欣喜，然而我相信他人亦有他人之思想，或许能令其更为欣喜。但是，当我从物理学上获得了一些普遍观念，并将之用于解决各种难题时，我发现其对我们的作用非常大，与时下的应用原则大相径庭。因此我认为，若藏而不露，不免严重违反我们必须促进的法律体系，甚至与我们仰赖的人类的整体利益相背离了。因为我看到，凭借这些理念，我们可能得到一些对人生非常有益的知识，也可能发现一种实用哲学来代替经院中的思辨哲学，进而知道火、水、空气、星星、天空，以及环绕我们的其他所有物体的力量和作用。正如同我们明了匠人的各种技术一样，而后我们可以因势利导，充分利用，进而使我们成为自然的主人和所属者。我们期待这样的结果，不仅是为了发明数不清的技术，使我们能够毫不费力地享受地球的各种资源，尤其是为了保持健康。因为，毋庸质疑，健康是人生最为重要的幸福，也是其他幸福之基础。因为人之精神在很大程度上取决于身体器官的状况和关系，倘若能找到一种方法可以使人变得比现在更聪明、更能干，我认为这只能在医学中探求了。现有之医学鲜有显著之疗效，这是千真万确的。如此说毫无轻视医学之意。我相信，任何一个人，包括医学业内人士在内，都不会不承认，医学上目前所有已知的东西，与尚待发现的东西相比，几乎等于零。如果我们对于无数的身心疾病及衰老的原因能有充分的了解，并能充分认识自然所提供的一切药物，我想我们是可以免除疾病的，甚至也许可以延长寿命。所以我打定主意，愿穷毕生精力来寻求此极其必要之科学，而且我已经找到了一种途径。在我看来，任何人只要照着走，必定可以万无一失地达到目的，除非他因生命短促或是经验不足而受阻。因此我认为，要排除这两重障碍，最好把自己的发现忠实地、毫无保留地与大家交流，激发优秀的天才们进一步研究。依各人的倾向和能力，从事必要的实验，把自己可能发现的所有东西告诉大众，薪火相传，通力合作，从而把许许多多人的生命和劳动汇合在一起，群策群力，我们所得之成绩比之单干，可能要卓著得多。

关于实验，我还说过，一个人所学的知识越是高深，就越是需要实验。因为刚开始研究的时候，我们宁可只采用那些能自然地呈现到我们感官中的实验，以及我们不可能忽略的实验（这样的实验，我们略加思考便可得到），而不是关注非同寻常和深奥晦涩的现象。原因在于：只要普通常见现象的原因尚未知晓，非同寻常现象常常只会误导我们。现象所依靠之条件几乎总是很特殊、很细微，非常不易觉察的。但关于这一点，我采取了下列步骤：首先，找出万物的普遍原则，只把上帝作为万物之根源，而不考虑其他概念。只发掘灵魂深处固有之真理萌芽，从中找出原因。其次，我仔细观察从这些普遍原则能引申出什么最为常见的结果。我发现天体、星宿、地球，以及地球上的水、气、火、矿等等都是最常见、最简单的，也是最容易了解的。后来，我又想用这些普遍原理进而研究更特殊的事物。然而，此时许许多多森罗万象的事物呈现眼前，使我发现，若非我们自己利用各种特殊实验据果寻因，仅以人之心灵来分辨世界上的各种物类是绝不可能造出来的。因为除了地球上的物种以外，上帝所造的东西或者所要供人用的东西还有其他数不清的物种。因此，我把感官所得的印象在心中辗转思索后敢大胆申说，我所碰到的事物，无不可用我所发现的原则圆满解答。然而还必须承认，自然之力量虽然巨大无比、广袤无边，但这些原则也非常简易、非常笼统。因此我注意到，几乎没有一个单一的特殊原则可以从这些原则中由各种途径推衍出来。我最大的困难是，通常难以判定这些结果究竟依靠哪种方式得来。为了克服这种困难，我认为没有别的办法，只能再次求之于特定的实验，依实验结果的不同来决定改用哪种方式。关于其他的事情，我现在觉得我非常清楚地认识到，应该采取什么方法来做大部分实验以证明我的理论。不过，同时我也意识到，这些实验是如此纷繁杂多，而我只有两只手，收入也少，纵使再多出几千倍也无法把一切实验做完。因此，我在获取自然知识方面能有多大进展，就要看我今后有多少条件来做实验了。这就是我写那篇专题论文希望大家了解的，并且我明确指出大家由此所能得到的益处。所以，我要求一切从内心深处关心人类福利的人，也就是所有真正品德高尚的人，而不是那些沽名钓誉、表里不一的人，希望他们能将已经做过的实验跟我交流一下，以便对我将要做的实验给予帮助。

但从那以后，我又不断发现别的理由使我改变了自己的看法。我觉得应当实实在在地继续写下去。凡我认为重要之物，任何时刻，只要我能证明其真实性，就要原原本本将之写出来，而且力求字斟句酌，如同打算出版一样。我喜欢这个过程，因为这样做我可以反复推敲，彻底考察。因为，毫无疑问，我们相信，准备给许多人看的书总是会处处检查，而只给我们自己写的书则不免马虎（惯常遇到的情况是，我第一次认识时觉得是对的，动笔时又发现了错误）。还因为，如果一味为自己写作，我便没有机会给公众提供益处。同样，若我的东西有什么价值的话，在我身后，有机会读我书的人也许会将之用于正当途径。但是，我已下定决心，决不同意在有生之年将之出版，以免引来反驳或争论，甚至给我招来无可奈何的毁誉，耽误我预留出来准备使自己进步的时光。因为尽管人人都应当竭力为他人谋福利，而若对他人无益，则真真正正是毫无用处可言，这是千真万确的。然而，同样千真万确的是，我们应该高瞻远瞩，放眼未来，着眼于完成能对后人带来更大幸福之工作，而将也许对今人有益之事暂付阙如，亦无不可。其实，我很乐于告知大家，我至今所知之物，比之未知世界，可谓是冰山一角。但是对我能够获得的知识，我并没有绝望。在各门学科里渐渐发现真理的人，简直就如同已经开始致富的人一样，不费力气就能获得很大收益，不像以前贫困时那样，费了很大力气，稍营微利亦觉困难；亦可将在各门学科中寻求真理的人们比作军队的将军，通常他们军队打的胜仗越多，则军队愈加强大。将军们在军队遭惨败时，比之攻城占省得胜时，则需要更大智慧才能把军队统领在一起。寻求真理的人们努力克服妨碍他们认识真理的种种困难，纠正种种错误。如同在战场上一样，在任何有些许普遍性和重要性的事情上，若接受错误看法就如同打了败仗，要恢复原来的阵地委实不易，比之有可靠原则指导前进需要更多的技巧。至于我自己，若说我已经发现一些学科上的真理的话（我相信此书中的内容可以证明，我已经发现了一些），我可以声明说，这些真理是在克服了五六个重大困难后得到的结果，也可以说是打了五六场胜仗后取得的胜利果实吧。我甚至还可以毫不犹豫地说，只要再有两三场类似的胜仗，我的计划就可全部实现。我年龄还不算大，按照常理，我还有足够的时间可以完成这个计划。可是，我自己觉得，越是想好好利用时间，越是觉得剩下的时间应该好好珍惜。若是将我的物理学原理发表，势必会惹出事端，不免耽搁时间。尽管这些原理几乎全都十分明了，只要理解它们就会予以赞同。虽然每一原理我都可以给予证明，可是别人的意见多种多样，我的原理不可能都与之相契合，所以我预料定会引起各种反驳，使我会经常偏离我的宏伟计划。

当然也可以说这些反驳并非无益，一则可以使我意识到自己的错误；二则若我的思想含有某些价值，也可以使他人能更充分地理解。更重要的是，人众知识就广博，这可引导他人从现在起就开始利用我的原则，反过来，我也可以从他们的发现中得到帮助。但是，尽管我承认自己极易犯错，且心里第一次产生想法时几乎从来不敢自信。然而，基于经验，由于旁人对我的见解可能会给予反驳，所以我不期望从他们那里得到益处。因为我已经多次验证他们的批评，有的来自朋友，有的来自不相干的人，甚至有些人心怀恶意和嫉妒。我知道，我的朋友因偏袒而忽略的问题，他们都不遗余力加以揭露。可是，他们的反驳，鲜有为我所忽略。即或有，也是一些细枝末节，离题很远。因此，在我看来，我所遇到的对我观点提出反驳的批评家，没有一个比我更严格、更公正。此外，我从未发现经院式辩论会把从前未知晓的真理阐述明白，因为争辩之时人人都竭力求胜，都想将似是而非之理论说得极其中听，很少权衡双方针对问题提出的理由。而且，那些长期从事辩护的优秀律师，并不一定因此后来就会成为更优秀的法官。

至于我的思想能给旁人带去多少益处，我想不会太多。因为我的思想还不完全成熟，还需添加很多东西才能用于实践。我想我可以毫不虚夸地说，如果有谁能将我的思想长久贯彻，那么这个人应该是我自己，而不会是别人。并不是说世上没有比我更聪明之人，而是因为从别人那里学来的某个东西，比之自己发现的某个东西，是无法很好把握、运用自如的。这层道理用到这里很贴切，因为我曾将自己的思想解释给一些非常聪明的人。在我讲时，他们似乎理解得很清楚，然而，若让他们复述，我就注意到他们几乎把原来的东西改得面目全非了，连我自己都不敢相信那是我的思想。我很高兴借此机会顺便请求后人注意，凡未经我自己发表之作，切勿道听途说，以为是我所作。那些古代哲学家，其著作不传于世，而后人往往将一些荒诞不经之作强加在其名下，对此我丝毫不觉得奇怪。然而，我并不因此就以为他们的思想真的荒诞不经，因为我明白，他们是当时他们那个时代最有智慧的人，只不过那些著作传给我们时已经走样了。因此，我们都能注意到，先哲们的弟子竟无一人能超越他们。我非常相信，现在那些最狂热地遵奉亚里士多德的信徒，若能得到与亚里士多德一样多的自然知识，也会觉得他们自己很幸福，纵使在以后永远都不能得到更高水平知识的情况下也会觉得他们自己很幸福。从这一点看来，那些信徒就像常春藤一样，从不企图爬过自己依附的大树，而是爬到树的顶端之后，常常会转头往下爬。因为在我看来，那些信徒也在走下坡路。换句话说，如果他们放弃学习，那么本来明智的他们也会变得不明智了。这些人对原著者已经明白解释过的道理已经全部知道了，却还不满足，还要拿难题向原著者求答案。其实这些难题的答案，不但原著者没说过一个词，而且也许从未想过那么多。不过他们那种研究哲学的方法倒是很适合才智平庸的人。因为他们使用的范畴和原理都晦涩难懂，使他们能信心十足，评说一切，仿佛真懂一切事情，而且能为他们所说的任何主题辩护，对抗最巧妙、最有技巧的说法，不让任何人指出他们的错误来。他们这样做，在我看来就好像一个盲人一样，为了与能看得见的人地位平等地交战，就先要将对方拖入漆黑的山洞底部。因此，我若不把我使用的哲学原理发表出来，这些人倒是占了便宜，因为我的原理非常简单、非常明确，要是发表出来，正无异于把窗子打开，将阳光送到了他们跑下去交战的山洞里了。就连那些最聪明之人，也大可不必急于知道我的这些原理，如果他们所要的只是能够高谈阔论，赢得博学之美誉，那是很容易达到目的的，只要满足于真理的表象就可以了。这些表象的东西在各种事情中都能找到，无需多大困难。相比之下，要寻求真理本身则只能层层剥笋，慢慢展开，并且只能在某些领域探索，所以就没那么容易了。因此，这就要求我们在说到其他领域时就得坦白地承认自己的无知了。然而，如果他们并不做出无所不知的样子，而是想知道那么几条真理，这点知识毋庸质疑是值得知道的，并且如果他们打算选择类似我的方法行事，那么看看我在这篇谈话中已经说过的就行了，并不需要我再多说什么。如果他们能力比我强，可以取得比我更大的成就，他们自己一定更有能力去发现我认为自己已经发现的一切。因为我研究事物一向是按部就班，所以尚待发现之物，比之我已能够发现之物本身一定更困难、更深奥。因此从我这里学习那些尚待发现之物，倒不如自己去发现来得痛快。除此之外，他们若能从探索简单问题入手，慢慢地逐步入难，养成循序渐进的习惯，那比接受我的教诲还要有益得多。就拿我自己来说，我现在所证明的一切真理，如果自幼就有人教我，并且我也毫不费力地学会它们，那么我相信，也许除这些之外，我再也不会知道什么。至少可以说，我永远不会养成现在拥有的习惯和能力，让我在致力于探索时，能够一直得心应手地发现新的真理。总之，如果世上有一种工作，除了创始人之外他人无法尽善尽美地完成，那便是我所做的工作了。

为了完成这项工作需要进行种种实验，单凭一个人的力量确实无法完成。但是，一个人在这项工作中能很好利用的也只有自己的双手而已，此外就只有借助于匠人或者诸如此类的人，给他们付钱，满足他们希望得到的回报（这是一种非常有效的方法），这样可以激励他们按规定完成分派给他们的任务。还会有一些人，他们出于好奇或某种欲望想学点知识，自愿出力帮忙。可是，一般而言，这类人承诺多于行动，他们会提出很好的构想，可是没有一个能实现。毫无疑问，他们期望解释一些难题来减少他们的麻烦，或者至少通过几句恭维话和无用的演讲来证明他们耗费了不少时间。至于别人已经做过的实验（将之视为瑰宝者是永远不会公开的），即便那些人愿意告知你，那些实验多半也是内容繁杂，有大量无用枝节和多余成分，要想从其附加物中辨别出真理来非常困难。而且，你会发现，几乎所有实验都描述得很糟糕，甚至错误百出（因为做实验者希望从实验中只看见那些一定能符合自己原则的实验结果），即便是在大量实验结果中确实有一些符合你目的的东西，也需耗费时间筛选，结果不免得不偿失。因此，世上若真有那么一个人，我们很确定地知道他能有最伟大之发现，并且最有可能为大众谋利，而且如果其他所有人都尽心竭力帮他，使其能成功地完成计划,那么依我看，能帮得上他的也仅限于提供经费以资助他进行必要的实验，或者是阻止任何人无缘无故突然打扰他，浪费他的时间罢了。除此之外，其他人无能为力。此外，我个人并不敢十分自负，愿意向世人承诺将来会有什么非同寻常的成绩，也不愿异想天开，以为大众必定会对我的计划多么感兴趣。不过，从另一方面讲，我的灵魂也并没有低贱到被人认为一文不值，只能接受别人帮助的地步。

这些顾虑加在一起便是使我三年来都不愿将手上的论文发表的原因。也是这个原因，我甚至下定决心，在有生之年，凡涉及普遍原理的论文，或者能使人理解我的物理学原则的论文，都一概不发表。可是从那时起，我发现两个理由使我不得不在此赘述一些特殊的样文，向大家叙述一下我所做之事和构思计划。第一条理由是：假如我没有发表，许多人知道我以前曾有意出版几部作品，他们或许会认为，我之所以放弃出版是因为我觉得这些东西带给我的荣誉比实际应得的少。因为虽然我不会过分地希冀名利，或者，如果我可以放开胆量说的话，尽管因为与其他东西相比，我已拥有了太多的荣誉，所以只要我认定荣誉是极端令人讨厌的，我甚至就厌恶荣誉，但同时，我也从不尽力隐藏自己的行为，如同犯了罪似的，也没有采取许多防范，不让人了解我。我认为那样做，一方面对不起自己，另一方面也给自己带来不安，还会再次违反我所追求的精神的绝对宁静。而且，尽管我始终采取漠然态度，不求名也不求无名，然而还是不能阻止自己获得某种荣誉，因此我想还是应当尽力而为，至少不被别人说三道四，以免受挖苦。我之所以写这些哲学样文的另一个理由是：由于我需要做的实验太多，不胜枚举，我逐渐感觉我的自修计划不得不活生生地一天天推迟。若无他人帮助，我是不太可能完成的。虽然我不敢自诩大众会对我的工作有大力赞助，但是，我也不愿让后人发现我如此不负责任，因为我本来可以把我已经完成的工作以更完美的状态留给他们，但是如果因为我的太过疏忽而没使他们明白他们能够用什么方法帮助我完成计划，这样就会使那些比我活得长久的人某一天在某个场合拿这事来指责我。

我认为选几件事情来加以说明并非难事，这些事既不至于引起很大争论，也不应该违背我的意愿，过多地解释我的原理。但是，这些事应该可以清楚地说明我在各门学科中能完成什么，不能完成什么。这项工作成功与否不该由我评说。我也不能抢在别人的判断之前，自己先对自己的作品评论一番。但是我很乐意大家能来审查我的作品。为了鼓励大家有更多的兴趣来审查，我请求不管什么人，若对我的著述有任何反驳，还请费神将意见交给我的出版商。待出版商转达我之后，我好立刻将答复附到书里。如此读者可以同时看到两家之言，便更容易辨别真理在哪里了。因为我不喜欢任何冗长答词，所以只要认识到了错误，我便会痛快承认。若我看不出错误之处，就只会把我以为必需说明之事加以申说，为自己写的东西辩护，同时不牵涉新问题，以免从一件事说到另一件事，越说越远，没完没了。

我在《折光学》和《气象学》两文开头所谈的一些东西，初看可能有些奇怪，因为我称它们为假设，似乎无意为它们提供证据。不过我请求读者耐着性子仔细通读全文，这样我希望那些有疑虑者或可得到满意的答案。因为在我看来，这些论文中的推理是相互联系的，前者与后者互为因果，反过来也互为果因，可以互相证明。大家可不要以为，我这是犯了逻辑学家的所谓循环论证的毛病。经验告诉我们，这些结果大多数是非常可靠的，我根据某些原因将之推衍出来，并非是要证明其实际存在，恰恰相反，结果之真实倒足以证明原因之真实。我之所以称它们为假设也无别的用意，只不过想让大家明白，根据之前我已经详加解释的那些首要的真理是能把它们推衍出来的。可是我决意不那么做，以防止某些聪明人利用此机会，说他们是在我的原则上建立起浮泛的哲学，从而陷害我因此承担责任。我指的是那样的人，他们以为，旁人费了20年工夫所想出的东西，只要向他们略道一二，他们便可以在一日之内精通无余。这类人越是伶俐机灵就越容易犯错误，越不能非常正确地认识真理。至于那些真正完全属于我的见解，我并不辩解说它们确实是新的。因为我知道，如果大家把我那些见解好好考量一番，就会发现这些见解是非常简单且合乎一般常理的，比之他人对于同样问题所持的意见，并无什么特别和奇怪之处。我也并不自诩为这些真理的最初发明者，只想声明，我之所以采取这些意见并不是由于别人这样说过，也并不是由于别人没有这样说过，只是因为理性向我证明了它们的真实性罢了。

我在《折光学》里完成的发明创造，纵然匠人们不能立刻就制造出来，我也不认为什么人能因此就鄙视这种发明。因为一定要有熟练的技巧才能把我所描述的那些机器制造出来，调准好。如果匠人们第一次实验就能成功，我倒觉得非常惊奇了。这不亚于说，一个人光凭一本极好的乐谱，学了一天就能成为一个娴熟的吉他表演者。我用本国语言法语，而没有用导师们的雅言拉丁文来写这本书，是因为我希望那些能无偏见地运用天赋理智的人，比之那些只看重古代著述的人，更能判断出我的意见是否合理。至于那些能把好的理性和学习习惯结合起来的人是我唯独向往的评判者，我相信他们绝不会只是因为偏好拉丁文，而我用本国语法语来写，他们就会掩耳不听我的推理。

总而言之，关于我将来希望在各门学科方面作出哪些特别贡献，在此我不愿细谈，也不愿拿自己没有把握完成的事情贸然向大家承诺。我要说的只是：我已经下定决心，在有生之年，我愿将所有时间用于获得一些自然知识，这些知识能够使我们推衍出一些规则供医学使用，让这些规则比目前使用的规则更为准确。其他追求一概置之度外，尤其是那些对一些人有利，却对另外一些人有害的事情。假如迫于形势我不得不为之，我想也一定不会成功的。这一点是我要在这里向大众声明的，虽然我非常明白，声明过后，世人也不会因此看得起我。老实说，我压根也不想要世人如此看重我。我不希望任何人赐给我俗世的高官厚禄。我永远感谢那些宽宏大量的人，允许我安享退隐生活，免受打扰。

Table of Contents

封面

总序

译者序

Part I

Part II

Part III

Part IV

Part V

Part VI

第一部分

第二部分

第三部分

第四部分

第五部分

第六部分